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In this thesis, I provide an account of Rawls’s Original Position and his justification for 
it. I reject some of the specific arguments Rawls mounts in favour of the Original Position, 
and I critically discuss Rawls’s justificatory framework of wide reflective equilibrium. I 
finish off by advancing a novel argument in favour of Rawls’s Original Position.  
Rawls argues that his principles of justice are justified if they would be chosen from 
within the Original Position. Since which principles are chosen depends on the particular 
features of the Original Position, in order for the principles to be justified, the features of 
the Original Position must themselves be justified. Rawls does this by bringing to bear 
certain abstract philosophical considerations, the features of the Original Position and 
considered judgments about particular cases into wide reflective equilibrium with one 
another. 
Ultimately this project rests on the idea that appealing to considered judgments, as Rawls 
does when he uses wide reflective equilibrium, is problematic. I argue against wide 
reflective equilibrium by making two arguments. The first argument is that wide 
reflective equilibrium is either conservative or incoherent. Neither option is acceptable 
to Rawlsians. The second argument concerns whether wide reflective equilibrium is an 
appropriate method with which to examine the comparative stability of moral 
conceptions. I argue that the only acceptable method is to appeal to analytically true or 
empirically well supported premises where appropriate. 
This undermines some of the considerations like generality and publicity that Rawls 
brings to bear on features of the Original Position. I argue that the generality claim 
cannot be rescued and that the argument from generality in favour of the Veil of 
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Ignorance is flawed. I pare down Rawls’s account of publicity to its essentials and justify 
this weaker version of publicity by showing that multiple accounts of stability for the 
right reasons in a pluralistic society can support it. I then use this account of publicity to 
argue for a modified account of people’s highest order interests. 
I then advance an argument for the Original Position that does not suffer from the 
defects that I argue plague Rawls’s argument. The central feature of this argument is the 
argument for the Veil of Ignorance. The key difference between my argument and 
Rawls’s is that Rawls’s argument supposes that the Veil of Ignorance changes how the 
parties would choose and that there is something wrong with the choice situation when 
the Veil is absent. By contrast I argue that the Veil is justified because it does not change 
how an ideal observer would choose. The Veil of Ignorance is justified because it 
simplifies the ideal observer situation without changing its outcome and thus makes it 
easier for us to figure out what ideal observers would choose. The account of the parties 
as rational and mutually disinterested falls out naturally as a consequence of the 
argument for the Veil of Ignorance. Combined with the modified version of Rawls’s 





In his book, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls proposed that the principles of justice are those 
that would be chosen by rational, mutually disinterested parties in the Original Position (OP). 
Fundamental features of the OP are that these parties representing the members of society 
choose these principles without recourse to various facts pertaining to either themselves or 
that society. With regard to the latter, the OP features a Veil of Ignorance which hides 
information about who the parties are representing, and the society that they or those they 
represent will find themselves in when the Veil is lifted. Some general facts about society, 
namely those given by consensus among experts in the social sciences, are not hidden by this 
Veil. The parties in the OP are tasked with choosing principles, specified in terms of diverse 
primary goods as for example, the various liberties, wealth, opportunities, positions of power 
and responsibility, and the social bases of self-respect, as well as the distribution of these 
primary goods. The choice of the parties is also regulated by a conception of a person’s 
highest order interests.  These interests consist in the exercise and development of their two 
moral powers: a capacity for the conception of the good and a sense of justice as well as the 
pursuit of the conception of the good. Moreover, principles so chosen in the OP would be 
widely and stably acceptable in a pluralistic society. These principles are as follows: 
(a)  Each  person  has  the  same  indefeasible  claim  to  a fully  adequate 
scheme  of equal basic  liberties, which  scheme  is  compatible  with the  
same  scheme  of liberties  for  all; and  
(b)  Social  and  economic  inequalities  are to  satisfy  two  conditions:  first, 
they  are to  be  attached to  offices  and positions  open  to  all  under 
conditions  of fair equality of opportunity; and  second,  they  are  to be  to  the  
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greatest benefit  of  the  least-advantaged  members  of  society (the  difference  
principle). (Rawls 2001, pp42-43) 
It should be noted that which principles are chosen depends on the various features of the OP. 
If the principles are to be justified, then, the particular set of features in its entirety has to be 
justified as well. Since, these features, as originally proposed by Rawls, have been thought to 
model acceptable constraints on reasoning, the justifiability of the principles depends at least 
in part on how acceptable the constraints on reasoning modelled by the OP are.  In addition to 
these initial constraints on reasoning, the OP, as proposed by Rawls, has been justified by 
testing conformity between the principles of justice and the pre-theoretical considered 
judgements through a process of wide reflective equilibrium (WRE). 
In this thesis, I will show that Rawls’s arguments for the various features of the Original 
Position are inadequate and I will offer an alternative set of arguments for those various 
features. I first aim to show that WRE is inadequate as a justificatory method in establishing 
the limits of convergence in a well ordered society. I will then partly answer one of the 
objections to alternatives to WRE by advocates of WRE by showing how the thick and 
selective constraints that Rawls invokes can be thinned out into a purely formal account of 
said considerations. I will finally complete my reply to these objections by showing how the 
OP can be derived from these purely formal considerations. 
In the first chapter, I set out what I believe to be Rawls’s views on the central aim of moral 
theory: the stability of some conception of justice. I explore how he relates this to his meta-
justification of WRE. I will reconstruct Rawls’s argument for the veil of ignorance, the nature 
of the parties behind the veil and his account of the highest order interests. In addition, I show 
how the generality constraint relates to the veil of ignorance and also show how the publicity 
constraint is justified by a concern with stability.  
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One potentially devastating critique of reflective equilibrium is that there is no reason to think 
that the considered judgments the method relies on are credible (Brandt 1979). Rawls 
bypasses the credibility problem by setting aside the question of moral truth and instead 
assessing the extent to which widespread execution of the method would result in 
convergence. However, Rawls still desires that said method have certain epistemic elements, 
two of which are coherence and non-conservatism. In the second chapter, I argue that WRE 
cannot be both coherent and non-conservative. I will also argue that the method of WRE 
cannot tell us the extent of convergence. I will argue that in order to make progress to finding 
out what the extent of convergence is, we must rely on self evident premises for apriori 
propositions and well grounded empirical propositions for the relevant domain. Two related 
worries remain. The first worry is that one cannot adequately specify the various conditions 
without invoking some substantive conception of justice. The second worry is that even if 
one could do so, the resulting theory is so indeterminate as to be useless. 
In the third chapter, I will argue that one need not invoke a particular conception of justice in 
order to formally specify a certain set of constraints. I will then argue that the constraints on 
reasoning that Rawls invokes in his arguments are too selective and may not necessarily be 
widely acceptable in a society characterised by reasonable pluralism.  I argue that generality 
is too problematic a concept to use in justifying the Veil of Ignorance. I also argue that even 
if we were to take on board the ideas of generality and fairness that Rawls presumes are latent 
in the public political culture of a liberal democracy, the argument from such ideas to the Veil 
of Ignorance is unsuccessful. That is to say, imposing the Veil of Ignorance is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to generate principles that are general, impartial or fair. I propose 
weakening some of the aspects of the publicity constraint. I also show that the support for key 
aspects of the publicity constraint that pertain to Rawls’s non-perfectionism can be justified 
by a range of accounts of stability.  I also discuss some problems with Rawls’s account of 
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people’s highest order interests. I argue that Rawls mistakenly attributes the capacity for a 
sense of justice to the rational and that he should drop the aspect of the capacity for a 
conception of the good that has to do with modifying one’s final ends from his account of the 
highest order interests. 
In the fourth chapter, I shall answer the second worry. I shall show that a choice situation that 
highly resembles the OP in most respects and can provide justificatory force for principles of 
justice can be derived from premises that are self evident in the case of apriori claims and 
well evidenced for empirical claims. I start with an account of an ideally motivated and 
perfectly capable and knowledgeable reasoner tasked with choosing principles of justice. It is 
trivial that the parties in the choice situation I start off with will choose the correct principles. 
I will show that this choice situation can be simplified to the Original Position. I do this by 
showing that it is trivial to construct principles that are themselves invariant with respect to 
facts about the identity of the person the party represents, the personal particulars of the party 
and particular facts about the society the person will find him or herself in. I then show that it 
is precisely these sorts of principles that are practically relevant in terms of regulating the 
basic structure of a pluralistic society over time. Since the principles so constructed are 
invariant with respect to such facts, such facts can be blocked from the parties without 
affecting the content of the principles. This justifies the Veil of Ignorance. I then exploit the 
fact that the HOI represents all and only the morally relevant reasons to show that once the 
veil of ignorance is imposed, the motivational features of the parties can be reduced to being 
rational and mutually disinterested. Together with other conclusions from the third chapter 
this will suffice to justify a choice situation which differs only slightly from the OP.  
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Chapter 1: Justification and the Original Position – Rawls’s Account 
The Original Position (OP) is a choice situation with at least three major components. The 
first component is a set of choosing parties who represent the members of society. In the OP, 
the parties are characterised as rational and mutually disinterested. That is to say, that they 
will, subject to constraints, reject a given set of principles so long as there is another they 
prefer more. They do not care one way or another how well other parties do with respect to 
their respective preference orderings.  
The second part of the OP is the fundamental or highest order interests (HOI) of the member 
of society that the party represents. The HOI of a person is characterised as consisting of 
pursuing that person’s conception of the good and exercising and developing that person’s 
two moral powers (Freeman 2007, p297): the capacity for a conception of the good and the 
capacity for a sense of justice. The capacity for a conception of the good, according to Rawls, 
consists of the capacity to formulate the means to pursue one’s final ends as well as the 
capacity to assess and revise those final ends. The sense of justice consists of the normally 
effective desire to comply with the duties and burdens required by the principles of justice. 
The account of the highest order interests is supposed to ground valid claims. As such, a 
person’s HOI is the basis by which the party representing him orders the various alternative1 
conceptions presented to him.  
The third major feature of the Original Position is the Veil of Ignorance. The Veil of 
Ignorance blocks certain sorts of information about the persons they represent and the society 
they will live in from the parties. The Veil blocks information about the identity of the person 
being represented as well as personal particulars like the ethnicity, religious affiliation, 
conception of the good and talents that the person has. The Veil also blocks various markers 
                                                     
1
 The presentation of alternatives is one of the features of the OP. However, I will not be discussing this feature 
in this thesis. 
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of social position like how much wealth and power that person enjoys in any given society. 
Since Rawls conceives of the Veil as thick, it also hides specific information about the 
society. This includes demographic information which will reveal the likelihood that a given 
person has a particular characteristic as well as the particular historical circumstances people 
will find themselves in.  
Whichever principles are chosen by these parties would be deemed principles of justice. That 
a conception of justice is chosen in the OP is supposed to be sufficient in itself for its 
justification. As according to Rawls, “One conception is more reasonable than another... if 
rational persons in the initial situation would choose its principles over those of the other for 
the role of justice” (Rawls 1999, pp15-16), the OP is deemed to have justificatory force. 
Since the content of the principles depends crucially on the various features described above, 
the justificatory force of the OP is vindicated if and only if the various features of the OP 
described above are also justified.  
Rawls’s justification of the OP proceeds in two ways. Firstly, Rawls proposes that there is 
broad agreement on what should constrain moral reasoning: 
One argues from widely accepted but weak premises to more specific 
conclusions. Each of the presumptions should by itself be natural and 
plausible; some of them may seem innocuous or even trivial. The aim of the 
contract approach is to establish that taken together they impose significant 
bounds on acceptable principles of justice. (Rawls 1999, p16) 
Rawls provides a few instances of such conditions:  
“No one should be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural fortune or social 
circumstances in the choice of principles... It should be impossible to tailor 
7 
 
principles to the circumstances of one’s own case... [and] insure further that 
particular inclinations, aspirations and persons’ conceptions of their good do 
not affect the principles adopted.” (Rawls 1999, pp16-17) 
The OP incorporates these various conditions into its structure. But, this is not all there is to 
justifying the various features of the OP. The second aspect to justifying the OP, as proposed 
by Rawls, is to examine whether it matches the considered convictions of the parties and 
society. Rawls proposes that there is certainty about the answers to some questions. (Rawls 
1999, p17) The examples Rawls gives are of racial discrimination and religious intolerance, 
arguing that one reason to think that the OP has justificatory force is that it generates 
principles that are intuitively acceptable. The principles support judgments about particular 
cases that are held to strongly and intuitively by everyone and that are felt to have been 
arrived at with sufficient care. However, what if the “widely accepted but weak premises” 
conflict with the considered judgments? In addressing this conflict, Rawls writes,  
But presumably there will be discrepancies. In this case we have a choice. We 
can either modify the account of the initial situation or we can revise our 
existing judgments, for even the judgments we take provisionally as fixed 
points are liable to revision. By going back and forth, sometimes altering the 
conditions of the contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our 
judgments and conforming them to principle, I assume that eventually  we  
shall find a description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable 
conditions and  yields principles which match our considered judgments duly 
pruned and adjusted. This state of affairs I refer to as reflective equilibrium. 
(Rawls 1999, p18) 
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Rawls argues that since one can be highly confident about such judgments one can suppose 
that any correct or reasonable conception of justice would fit those judgments. Thus, Rawls 
argues, when confronted by a conception of justice which does not fit these considered 
judgments, the initial presumptions should be modified so that they would yield a conception 
that would fit the original considered judgments. Rawls presumes that the revised 
presumptions have the same initial plausibility as the original ones. If no acceptable 
considerations were found, however, the considered judgment, which was provisionally a 
fixed point would itself modified. 
By working back and forth between considered judgments, principles of justice and plausible 
constraints on reasoning, eventually all the ideas held would be in reflective equilibrium with 
one another. Rawls anticipated that sometimes these considered judgments in themselves 
would be modified and that at other times what are taken to be reasonable constraints on 
reasoning would be modified. This equilibrium is not stable as it could change if some 
previously unaccounted for considered judgment or initial consideration which conflicted 
with that equilibrium were found anew. Nevertheless, Rawls presumes that beliefs in 
equilibrium are justified. This method of working back and forth from both directions to 
bring one’s beliefs into reflective equilibrium is also called reflective equilibrium. I wish to 
draw attention to one distinction that Rawls makes. Narrow reflective equilibrium refers to a 
process whereby principles are devised to fit with the considered judgments about particular 
cases. Wide Reflective Equilibrium involves calling upon background theories and 
philosophical arguments to critique those judgments and provide grounds for their revision 
over and above what needs to be done to obtain maximum coherence with other considered 
judgments. The initial considerations that at least partly ground the OP involve these 
background theories and philosophical arguments.  
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While reflective equilibrium normally involves going back and forth between constraints on 
reasoning and considered judgments, when the initial considerations are themselves based on 
only conceptual truths and well grounded empirical claims, conflicts between considered 
judgment and background theory are always resolved in favour of the latter. Rawls, however, 
is sceptical about the prospects of finding such arguments. Background theories which are not 
grounded in either analytic truths or well-evidenced empirical claims but which people 
generally accept seem to be what would have to partially justify the OP and consequently the 
principles when such analytically true or empirically verified premises are lacking. To the 
extent that these premises are what people would believe strongly when they are thinking 
clearly and not unduly influenced by self interest these premises are considered judgments as 
well. Thus, even WRE is going to appeal to considered judgments at all levels of generality 
(Daniels 1996, pp22-23).  
Constructivism and The Independence of Moral Theory 
In order to appreciate the arguments Rawls brings to bear in favour of the various features of 
the Original Position, we need to understand what Rawls took to be the central aim of moral 
theorising. Rawls, in his account detailed in the paper, The Independence of Moral Theory 
(Rawls 1979), explicitly states that he has left aside the search for moral truth. The primary 
theoretical aim of moral theory in contrast to moral philosophy is the comparative study of 
the stability of societies well ordered by different moral conceptions. Rawls, in particular, 
adopts the question of which conceptions of morality a society could adopt and live by in 
perpetuity as the central concern of moral theory. People claim to be and in fact seem to be 
influenced by moral conceptions. Rawls wants to find out what conceptions people will hold 
under certain suitably described circumstances. He suggests that when a society is well 
ordered by a conception of justice, people accept and know that everyone accepts that 
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conception of justice. Furthermore, the society is such that the operation of the basic structure 
serves to inculcate this conception of justice and its attendant ways of reasoning. When 
society exists at such an equilibrium point, the reasons provided by the principles in the 
conception serve as a public and objective way of reasoning that is distinct from any given 
individual’s point of view. That is to say, Rawls supposes that it is sufficient to meta-justify 
reflective equilibrium if it can be shown that everyone who employs reflective equilibrium 
will converge or at least partially converge on a set of political principles. Moreover, these 
principles should generate their own support by motivating people to support institutions 
which in turn shape people’s moral psychology in ways that result in them affirming those 
same principles in WRE. 
Given the sort of stability that Rawls is concerned with, one of the key facts that constrain the 
conceptions of justice is the fact of reasonable pluralism. In a free society, people exercising 
their theoretical and practical reason may come to different conclusions about a variety of 
matters. This can be because the evidence bearing on a case may be complex, there may be 
disagreement about the weights of various considerations even the relevance of those 
considerations is not in dispute, because our all our concepts are subject to hard cases, our 
evaluative standards are themselves shaped by our own unique experiences and standpoint, 
and that there are often a variety of normative considerations on both sides of a given issue. 
All this ensures that the conscientious exercise of reason by persons on a given subject does 
not guarantee agreement on that subject (Rawls 2001, pp35-36).  This results in the existence 
of reasonable pluralism; that is to say, there will exist, blameless disagreement about a variety 
of fundamental moral and philosophical questions. 
Rawls’s account of stability can be thought of as a shared reasons account. In his account, 
people with different comprehensive doctrines have different and even incompatible non-
11 
 
political values, but share a set of political values. When it comes to political matters, they 
regard their political values as overriding their non-political values whenever there are 
conflicts between them. They refrain from invoking the whole truth as they see it because 
they all endorse the liberal principle of legitimacy; that only when political power is 
“exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may 
reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as 
reasonable and rational” (Rawls 1993, p217) is it legitimate. Rawls also presumes that the 
political virtues of tolerance, readiness to meet others halfway, reasonableness and sense of 
fairness are widespread enough that accepting the liberal principle of legitimacy is not 
onerous. In addition, Rawls argues that when there is an overlapping consensus, there are 
very few such conflicts in the first place. This is because people see the political values as 
being compatible with their personal values. 
Cooperation and Society 
Before, proceeding to Rawls’s arguments for the Original Position, I will explicate Rawls’s 
account of cooperation and society. Rawls conceives of society as a system of cooperation 
over time. The principles of justice are, consequently, the fair terms of cooperation that 
would order the fundamental institutions of society. The idea of cooperation has, according to 
Rawls, three essential features. 
(a) Social cooperation is distinct from merely socially coordinated activity - 
for example, activity coordinated by orders issued by an absolute central 
authority. Rather, social cooperation is guided by publicly recognised rules 




(b) The idea of cooperation includes the idea fair terms of cooperation: these 
are terms each participant may reasonably accept, and sometimes should 
accept, provided that everyone else likely accepts them: Fair terms of 
cooperation express an idea of reciprocity or mutuality: all who do their 
part as recognised rules require are to benefit as specified by a public and 
agreed upon standard. 
(c) The idea of cooperation also includes the idea of each participant’s rational 
advantage, or good. The idea of rational advantage specifies what it is that 
those engaged in cooperation are seeking to advance from the standpoint 
of their own good. (Rawls 2001, p6) 
 
Rawls’s defence of the hypothetical choice situation is rather sketchy. He appeals to the 
social contract tradition as found in Locke, Rousseau and Kant (Rawls 1997, p10), but offers 
little in support of why that tradition should be adhered to. The most that does seem to be said 
is that fair terms of cooperation are conceived as being agreed to by those subject to said 
terms (Rawls 1993, p23). Freeman’s reconstruction and defence of Rawls offers little more. 
According to Freeman 
The only way for free and equal persons to arrive at a conception  of  justice  
they  all  accept  is  by  an  agreement  among themselves. (Freeman 2010, 
p342) 
The above phrasing by both Rawls and Freeman leaves two possible interpretations open. 
The first interpretation is that the an explicit prior actual agreement by members of society is 
required in order for free and equal persons to arrive at a conception of justice they all accept. 
The second interpretation is that when free and equal persons all accept the same conception 
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of justice, there is a sense in which they actually agree to it. The first interpretation is 
vulnerable to the objections raised by Dworkin and Scanlon. I will discuss these objections 
later in the third chapter.  
The sense in which people would have to be free and equal in order to make the second 
interpretation come true would have to be in that they are equally situated with respect to 
bargaining power and are not subject to coercion by one another. This leverages on the 
intuition that there is something fair about agreements that are made in conditions where 
neither party is coerced by either circumstances or other parties. However, Rawls’s own 
account of what he means by citizens conceived of as free and equal refers to all persons 
having the two moral powers to the minimum degree required for social cooperation. 
However, these two accounts of freedom and equality are not logically coextensive. People 
who possess the minimum level of moral powers may nevertheless find themselves in 
circumstances where some are coerced by circumstances or other people. Implicitly, Rawls 
must be relying on the further premise that when it comes to matters regarding the basic 
structure, it is unfair to situate persons who have the two moral powers to at least a minimum 
degree in such a way that one has a bargaining advantage over the other, at least vis a vis 
assessing their acceptance of the fundamental terms of cooperation.  
Rawls develops the idea of persons as free and equal in the following way. Since people view 
themselves as possessing the two moral powers to the requisite minimum degree, they view 
themselves and one another as fully entitled to make claims on the basic structure. What this 
means is that no one person has any more moral authority than any other to determine what 
the terms of cooperation may be. . However, even given this last interpretation, it is not 
immediately obvious how that relates to a particular hypothetical agreement. The missing 
argument would have to be something along the following lines:  
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Bridging Principle: If there is a set of principles that free and equal people 
would accept and thus actually agree to, there must be some hypothetical 
contract situation which, when devised correctly, would reproduce those same 
principles.  
Something like the above Bridging Principle is required to justify the next step in Rawls’s 
argument for the OP. The choice situation will yield the correct principles just in case it 
models the appropriate constraints on reasoning. Among the initial constraints on reasoning 
Rawls invokes are the formal constraints on the concept of right such as generality, 
universality, ordering, publicity and finality. Rawls further argues that the constraints are 
ultimately justified only if they are stably held in WRE. According to Rawls, there are many 
ways to define these constraints and that the “merit of these definitions depends on the 
soundness of the theory that results” (Rawls 1997, pp112-113). Of the various constraints 
Rawls invokes I will be discussing generality and publicity. 
Generality, Impartiality and the Veil of Ignorance 
Principles are general to the extent that they exclude proper names and rigged definite 
descriptions. Rawls says little about generality or why proper names should be excluded 
except that the generality condition automatically excludes first-person dictatorship (Rawls 
1999, p114). Presumably, the generality condition is justified because it confirms our 
considered judgment that first person dictatorships (FPD) are unjust.  
Regarding the second aspect of generality, what makes a particular description rigged? 
Although Rawls is not explicit here, we can conjecture that a description is rigged when the 
features that are described are irrelevant from the moral point of view. Particular facts about 
themselves and their personal and historical circumstances are not seen as morally relevant 
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considerations. Rawls claims that the “particular facts about a person’s situation do not serve 
as good reasons in arguments to justify principles of justice” (Freeman 2006, p154) By this, I 
interpret Rawls to claim that the possession of those features  by any particular person is 
morally irrelevant or at least no more morally relevant than anyone else possessing those 
features. This systematises the notion of generality in the following way; if proper names 
cannot be included in a principle, nor can any description which is designed to benefit 
persons who are designated by those names. Thus, principles which include them fail to 
satisfy one of the constraints on the right.  
Trying to assert that some person’s possession of certain features can, ceteris paribus, be 
more morally relevant than someone else’s involves denying the basic moral equality that 
exists or is thought to exist between people. This also serves to justify the generality 
constraint by appealing to a version of impartiality. An argument for the Veil of Ignorance 
can be inferred from this: The Veil of Ignorance hides such information in order to prevent 
the parties from choosing principles that violate these constraints (Freeman 2006, p154).  
It seems that impartiality itself is subject to different interpretations and these different 
interpretations would in turn justify different Veils; the alternatives being a thick or thin Veil 
of Ignorance. A thin Veil only hides the identity of the person the parties represent. That is, 
while the parties know all the details of everyone, they do not know who they represent. The 
thick Veil of Ignorance hides particular details about persons as well as demographic 
information leaving general information about what kinds of differences there are, what kind 
of claims people advance and some general account of what people’s interests are. The thin 
Veil of Ignorance reflects a weak impartiality constraint and thus in turn the point of view of 
an impartial or judicious spectator. The impartial spectator sympathises equally with 
everyone and thus chooses classical utilitarian principles (Freeman 2011, pp157-158). The 
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thick Veil of Ignorance reflects a strong impartiality (Freeman 2011, p157) condition and 
thus in turn reciprocity which stands in between impartial altruism and mutual advantage 
(Rawls 1993, pp16-17). Choice behind the thick Veil of Ignorance yields Justice as Fairness. 
On the face of it, there seems, given just these initial considerations, to be no reason to prefer 
the thick Veil of Ignorance to the thin Veil. Both the weak and strong impartiality conditions 
seem roughly equally acceptable. In fact, the strong impartiality condition may be slightly 
less acceptable as the strong impartiality condition implies the weak one but not vice versa. 
Nevertheless, everything else being equal, both utilitarianism and Justice as Fairness would 
both be acceptable conceptions of justice.  
However, not all is equal. The thin Veil of Ignorance has counterintuitive implications. On 
Freeman’s account of Rawls, with a thin Veil, if the parties saw that a large proportion of the 
population belonged to one religion, they would be tempted to choose principles that would 
favour people of that religion and unfairly disadvantage people not of the religion. The weak 
impartiality condition is rejected in favour of the strong version because the latter supports 
our considered judgment that religious discrimination is unjust. The method of reflective 
equilibrium sanctions choosing a thick Veil in this instance. 
The hypothetical choice situation must symmetrically situate the parties in it in order to 
reproduce the principles which people conceived of as free and equal would accept. Freeman 
writes: 
A fair agreement to terms of social cooperation among free and equal persons 
requires that they be equally situated (Freeman 2010, p342). 
Rawls argues that this symmetrical situation requires the elimination of unfair bargaining 
advantages conferred by knowledge of one’s position in society (Rawls 2001, pp16-17).  A 
bargaining advantage, in this case, is unfair if it relies on factors which are arbitrary from the 
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moral point of view. This ties the argument from fairness to the account of the appropriate 
constraints on reasoning. The Veil of Ignorance is justified because it blocks morally 
irrelevant information from the parties.  
The Nature of the parties behind the Veil 
Given a Veil of Ignorance, the parties could have a number of dispositions. The parties could 
be “envious” and worry about the differences in people’s prospects. They may be “generous” 
or sympathetic and care about how other parties fare with respect to their own conception of 
the good. It is also possible for parties to be satisficing rather than maximising. 
Rawls provides three reasons for characterising the parties as mutually disinterested. Firstly, 
parties are assumed to be mutually disinterested, rather than “generous” or bound by strong 
bonds of fraternity in order to avoid assuming implausible motivational assumptions about 
persons. A conception of justice cannot rely on strong fellow feelings in order for it to be 
stable (Rawls 1997, p111). Secondly, the parties are not envious because that would make 
everyone worse off. Parties would be willing to choose rules in which the worst off were 
worse off than they could otherwise have been so long as this reduced the gap between them 
and the better off (Rawls 1997, p124). Thirdly, parties are described as mutually disinterested 
in order to model people’s conduct and motives under the circumstances of justice (Rawls 
1997, p112). Though not explicitly specified, the idea is that people may cede claims even if 
they have no obligation to. Finding out what justice requires involves abstracting away from 
people’s propensity to cede claims when they have no obligation to do so. 
Publicity, stability and the highest order interests 
Publicity, according to Rawls, has three levels to it. At all three levels, the idea of publicity is 
linked to the stability of a well ordered society. The first level recapitulates the very idea of a 
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well ordered society: one where everyone accepts and knows that everyone accepts the 
principles of justice as appropriate to regulate their relations with one another. (Rawls 1993, 
p66) Publicity in the first sense is required because that solves a mutual assurance problem. It 
is plausibly the case that people are unwilling to commit to a norm unless they can be sure 
that everyone else will similarly do so. When a principle is publicisable in this sense and also 
made public, people have less incentive to deviate from that norm. This improves the stability 
of that conception of justice. Thus conceptions of justice which cannot be publicised in this 
way are not likely to be stable. Rawls, also, adds the further condition that this agreement be 
supported by a shared set of beliefs and method of reasoning.  
The second level of publicity (Rawls 1993, p66) is that people should agree on a range of 
social facts and theories. To the extent that the shared beliefs required in the first level do not 
extend to anything beyond general social facts and theories, these two levels of publicity 
seem to be required if the conception of justice is to be acceptable to all reasonable persons in 
a pluralistic society. 
The third level of publicity requires that the full justification of the conception of justice be 
publicly available. By full justification, Rawls refers to the various arguments he presents in 
favour of his full view. This includes both the argument in favour of the OP as well as the 
argument from the OP. The justification for this is that the conception of justice that regulates 
society would be vulnerable to rejection if people who investigated its full justification found 
that the premises it relied on were controversial to the public. 
Apart from publicity, there is still one more constraint that Rawls invokes which can in 
principle be linked to stability: No restrictive assumptions are made on people’s conception 
of the good except that they are rational long term plans (Rawls 1999, p111). While Rawls 
does not explicitly provide a justification for it, it is easy to see how a concern for principles 
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being acceptable to everyone in a pluralistic society can constrain theorising by preventing us 
from making restrictions on conceptions of the good. This can even plausibly be a 
consequence of the third level of publicity. If the full justification of the conception of justice 
relied on premises which restricted conceptions of the good held by certain groups, then the 
full justification would be closed to those groups and thus not public. This no restrictions 
constraint can also be related to the second level of publicity in the following way. Invoking 
social facts and theories which are not publicly available is one of the ways in which 
conceptions of the good can be restricted. For example, Christian doctrine makes certain 
factive claims about the existence and the nature of God and the consequences of failure to 
believe in God or repent one’s Sins. If such claims are included under the set of general social 
facts and theories the conception of justice is based on, then the allowable conceptions of the 
good are in turn restricted to just the set of Christian ones.  
The initial choice situation would also likewise be modified. Placing restrictions on the 
conception of the good would make the equivalent change in the account of a person’s 
interests.  Persons would not just be conceived of as having two moral powers, there would 
be some further content as to what substantive commitments constitute an appropriate 
exercise of those moral powers. Appealing to general facts and theories which are at least in 
part not publicly available results in the Veil of Ignorance also including such non-public 
claims under the general social facts and theories which the choosing parties have access to. 
This modified choice situation will in turn result in a different principle being chosen. 
I wish to comment on the extent to which Rawls applies this last constraint. It seems that 
Rawls does not require that literally no restricting assumptions are to be made. After all, 
Rawls supposes that the political conception of justice is the subject of the overlapping 
consensus of a reasonable pluralism. Thus, according to Rawls, unreasonable comprehensive 
doctrines  cannot ground valid claims while reasonable doctrines do (Rawls 1993, pp60-61) 
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Rawls, however, asserts that invoking the fact of reasonable pluralism rather than mere 
pluralism does not make a difference as to the content of the principles chosen, but does 
affect the account of stability (Rawls 1993, pp64-65).Given this shared reasons model of 
stability, if we wish to model these public reasons, then the only values that carry weight are 
those that everyone shares. Similarly, the only general social facts and theories that can be 
used in our account are those that come from sources everyone finds authoritative. That is, 
only publicly available social facts and theories will play a role in the public reasoning and 
this, consequently, has to be reflected when modelling those reasons. Restrictive assumptions 
about conceptions of the good would also introduce ways in which the political values 
conflicted with some people’s non-political ones since any such assumptions would also be 
built into the content of the values so derived. If these assumptions contradicted some 
conception of the good people held, this would narrow the range of doctrines that would be 
compatible with the political values. 
Rawls claims that exercising and developing the moral powers constitutes people’s highest 
order interests in that they are necessary to engage in and gain the benefits of social 
cooperation. Rawls thus considers these highest order interests to be part of the rational. 
Rawls does little else to explicitly argue for the various aspects of people’s HOI. Presumably, 
each aspect is constitutive of or instrumental to enjoying the benefits of social cooperation. 
For example, a sense of justice is necessary for stable social cooperation and the latter is in 
turn necessary in order to obtain the benefits of social cooperation.  
In the second chapter, I will first address the use of wide reflective equilibrium and argue that 
such a use does not fulfil the aims of moral theory that Rawls adopts. This will in turn 
undermine some of the support that Rawls provides in favour of the generality and publicity 
constraints. I will, in the third chapter further argue that the generality constraint must be 
dropped and provide some arguments to shore up the publicity constraint, albeit with some 
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modifications. This will be done by showing that multiple accounts of stability can support 
the publicity constraint. I will also address the argument from fairness and show that even 
without the Veil, no party has a bargaining advantage over another. I will also address the 
account of highest order interests and show that it is a mistake to include the capacity to 
revise one’s final ends in this account. I will also show that Rawls’s argument for exercising 




Chapter 2: Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Justification 
The fundamental question is what makes it the case that the principles that are chosen from 
the OP are indeed the principles of justice? Since the principles chosen are dependent on the 
particular features of the initial choice situation, would it not be necessary to justify at the 
outset the various features of the OP themselves? This then raises the next question of, why 
should the particular features of the OP be part of the choice situation? Why should there be a 
choice situation in the first place? Finally, if the various features of the OP are not themselves 
justified, it would appear that the principles chosen by the parties behind the Veil would 
likewise not be justified. However, if the various features of the OP are justified, what is it in 
virtue of which, they are justified?  
To the extent that the justifications detailed in the previous chapter work, the OP can be 
deemed to be secure. However, if they are not secure, unless alternative justifications for this 
can be found, there should be scepticism as to whether or not the OP really provides any 
justificatory force. One potentially devastating objection to the account of reasoning given is 
that there is no positive reason to think that considered judgments at any level are credible as 
opposed to merely given a high credence to (Brandt 1979, p20). A systemisation of these 
judgments is thus, nothing special, but merely a systemisation of a person’s opinions. 
Norman Daniels (1996) provides three objections to the no credibility argument. The first 
objection is that the plausibility of the no-credibility charge depends on a comparison to 
observational reports which are prima facie credible because there is some causal story to tell 
about their reliability. Daniels argues that considered judgments are more like theoretical 
statements and thus play a different role than observational reports and thus we should not 
expect some causal story to account for their credibility (Daniels 1996, pp30-31). This 
objection is mistaken. Considered moral judgments need not be justified on some causal 
reliabilist story. Rather, to get WRE off the ground, any type of story which enjoys some type 
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of independent support must be provided that accounts for the credibility. That is to say, it is 
not the lack of a causal story which makes the no credibility charge stick; rather, it is the lack 
of any independent story which makes considered judgments problematic. 
The second objection is that the no credibility objection is premature. Observational reports 
have a significant body of relatively recent background theory which gives them the initial 
credibility they enjoy. That moral judgments do not have a similar background theory 
currently does not mean that they will never have one (Daniels 1996, pp31-32). This, 
however, does not mean that we can unproblematically take considered judgments to be the 
solid, but corrigible constraints on reasoning as the method of reflective equilibrium 
recommends. Appealing to considered judgments before any such story is available would 
also be premature. 
The third objection is a related, but more speculative point. It may be that current instances of 
moral agreement are not merely accidental. Perhaps people agree on those points because 
some elements of their background theories are true (Daniels 1996, p32). I will address this 
argument more completely later as Rawls offers a similar argument for reflective equilibrium 
in his own defence of it. Very briefly, I will argue that instead of offering a reason in favour 
of reflective equilibrium, this argument provides reasons for starting with background 
theories and focusing only on what can be shown logically or through credible empirical 
claims to be true. 
The Constructivist Move 
It is in light of the no credibility argument that Rawls’s account of the independence of moral 
theory from moral epistemology makes sense. If moral truth is to be bracketed in this way, 
then the no credibility objection becomes irrelevant. So long as the mode of reasoning creates 
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a convergence in views, at least ex hypothesi, it is sufficient that everyone accepts the 
conception of justice. Yet, it seems that if acceptance was all that was required, narrow 
reflective equilibrium would be sufficient. Roger Ebertz argues that while one’s initial 
considered judgments may be acceptable to everyone, after the process of WRE, when our 
judgments have been revised, the only people such judgments will be acceptable to may be 
ourselves (Ebertz 1993, p209). Also, insofar as the principles we affirm under WRE do not 
affirm the status quo, there is no telling what people’s moral psychology would be like when 
institutions reflecting the principles they currently affirm in WRE are instantiated. Moreover, 
if practical acceptability is the only criterion, one may want to ask why coherence and 
systematicity matter too.  
The answer to the last question may lie in the idea that while justifying principles of justice is 
a practical and not an epistemic one (Rawls 1980, p519), it contains epistemic elements 
(Rawls 1993, p62). One motivation for having epistemic elements is that since some people 
are wont to appeal to more than their considered judgments about particular cases when 
formulating principles of justice, people cannot expect to find narrow reflective equilibrium 
authoritative. There may be people who are tempted to appeal to wider philosophical 
considerations. During this process, they may come to affirm a different set of considered 
judgments. Moreover, there would be no principled way in which such wider appeal to 
philosophical argument could be designated an invalid argumentative move. Thus, an 
overlapping consensus based on narrow reflective equilibrium would not be stable. However, 
Rawls is not clear on which epistemic elements are part of practical reasoning. In principle, 
involving epistemic elements could reawaken the threat of the no credibility objection. After 
all, a sufficient number of people might read certain philosophy papers and come to seriously 
consider the possibility that considered judgments at any level are not credible. Thus, the 
authority of WRE could come into question. That is to say, in order for Rawls to reject 
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narrow reflective equilibrium in favour of WRE, he has to reject conservatism: the principle 
that the mere fact that one holds a belief is good reason to continue holding said belief. To be 
clear, I am not only claiming that conservatism ought to be rejected, but also that Rawls 
needs to reject epistemic conservatism in order to reject narrow reflective equilibrium. The 
problem with conservatism, is not an alleged unrevisability of considered judgments, but that 
not revising said judgments unless there are positive reasons to do so is inconsistent with 
holding that one’s beliefs are an appropriate response to the set of reasons one has. 
There are three versions of conservatism, the weak, the moderate and the strong versions. On 
the strong version, for some proposition P having a belief P is sufficient reason to believe P 
when P is not the sort of proposition that could be analytically true. The moderate version 
states that having a belief P contributes justificatory weight such that the combination of 
reasons (P + R) is sufficient to believe P when either R or P alone is not. The weak version of 
conservatism is that some set of reasons R may be sufficient to maintain a belief P when P is 
already believed, but not sufficient to justify believing P if P is not initially believed. 
The strong version of conservatism is absurd. Some R counts as a reason for P only if R is 
capable of providing occasion to revise confidence in P upwards. However, if R is identical 
to P, R can never provide occasion to revise confidence levels in P upwards. Thus, a 
proposition cannot be a reason for supporting that same proposition. The moderate version of 
conservatism faces the same problem, it is impossible for belief in (R+P) to increases the 
degree of confidence in P. The weak version of conservatism faces a somewhat different 
problem. Consider the following situation. 
John believes P on the basis of R such that if John did not possess R he would not believe P. 
However, if he did not initially believe P, having R would not be sufficient reason to believe 
P. John thinks weak conservatism is correct and also believes that R provides good reasons 
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for his belief P. Consequently he must think that believing P is a good response to R. John 
believes that it is possible for R to be defeated even if he is currently unaware of any 
defeaters. John believes that if R is defeated, he will stop believing P. John also believes that 
if the defeaters for R are in turn defeated, he will obtain R again. However, John now 
believes that if this turns out to be the case, he lacks sufficient reason to believe P. Thus John 
also believes that believing P is not an appropriate response to the set of reasons R. John, 
therefore, believes that P is and is not an appropriate response to R. This is clearly incoherent. 
The only way to avoid such incoherence is to reject epistemic conservatism. If a given set of 
reasons R justifies a belief P, this set of reasons does so regardless of whether P is initially 
believed or not. By extension, two people who both possess R and have no defeaters for R 
should believe P. If all the reasons that they have are the same, then all the beliefs they have 
must also be the same. 
As it is, what constructivism requires is a mode of reasoning which has certain features. 
Firstly, people using that mode of reasoning should converge or at least partially converge on 
some set of conceptions of justice. Secondly, this convergence should be stable through time. 
Thirdly, it should not be conservative (Scanlon 2003, p150). Fourthly, it should provide a 
coherent account of the various considerations and their relative importance. Finally, the 
principles that form part of the overlapping consensus cannot be indifferent to or in conflict 
with the truth (Rawls 1993, p150). This mirrors Daniels’ third reply to the no credibility 
objection. Given the fact of reasonable pluralism and the burdens of judgment the best 
explanation for persistent agreement may be that it reflects an underlying background theory 
which is true.  
If there is to be a partial convergence on some set of political conceptions of justice, given the 
burdens of judgment which would ordinarily lead to reasonable pluralism, the relative lack of 
pluralism cries out for explanation. Presumably, this conception or set of conceptions relies 
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on a body of belief which is itself not subject to conflicting considerations, or hard cases, or 
one for which different reasonable evaluative standards would not reach different judgments. 
That is to say, the only way in which the range of views about justice could be effectively 
narrowed in a well ordered society is if those beliefs ultimately relied on obvious and easily 
recognisable truths. Any adequate reasoning process must thus ensure that the resultant 
conception does not rely on false beliefs. 
Political constructivism thus requires a reasoning process that fulfils the above criteria, but it 
is an open question as to whether WRE, the reasoning process commonly associated with 
political constructivism, fulfils these criteria. 
Incoherence or Conservatism? 
The main competitor to WRE is deductive argument from self evident or empirically well 
grounded premises, hereafter called Sound Deductive Arguments (SDA). Since under WRE, 
arguments from such premises would be employed if such were available, WRE will always 
do at least as well as SDA in terms of getting people to converge to some specific conception 
of justice. This does not mean that WRE is superior to SDA. As I will argue WRE cannot 
satisfy both the coherence constraint and the non-conservatism constraint at the same time. 
Consider for instance Rawls’s argument for a thick Veil of Ignorance rather than a thin one. 
If there was no acceptable value like reciprocity supporting the thick Veil of Ignorance, then 
only the thin Veil would have adequate theoretical support and thus the counter-intuitive 
implications would have to be accepted. This is because under WRE, if there are no 
acceptable initial constraints which could support a particular judgment via principles 
selected in a suitably constructed choice situation, then that judgment must be revised even if 
that judgment is very intuitively plausible. 
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However, this presents a problem, or at least a puzzle. At least in principle, considered 
judgments about cases, while pre-theoretical, are supposed to be somewhat supported by 
reasons. Similarly, so should the initial considerations. In any given case, the reasons 
supporting the considered judgments may be stronger than the reasons supporting the initial 
considerations in which case the latter must be revised or vice versa. This means that if and 
only if the reasons in favour of the judgment that religious discrimination is unjust are 
stronger than the reasons brought to bear in favour of weak impartiality, the weak impartiality 
judgment must be revised. This should be the case regardless of the acceptability or lack 
thereof of any alternative initial condition. Yet, if strong impartiality was insufficiently 
acceptable, the reasons supporting weak impartiality would “win out” over the reasons 
supporting the considered judgment that religious intolerance was unjust. Unless any reason 
that would make strong impartiality less acceptable also made weak acceptability more so, 
there is no reason to think that the unacceptability of the strong impartiality constraint would 
render the weak impartiality constraint so justified as to overcome the prima facie reason 
provided by the religious tolerance judgment against the thin Veil of Ignorance. But such 
would have to be the case not just for this one case, but for any other conflict between initial 
consideration and considered judgment. If this account of what justifies deciding in favour of 
initial consideration or considered judgment about particular cases in any particular conflict is 
accurate, then under WRE, the ordering of the relative weights of various considerations 
changes based on some feature of a third irrelevant alternative. This is clearly incoherent. 
One could alternatively argue that in this case both the reasons provided by the strong 
conception of impartiality and those provided by the considered judgment are together 
stronger than the reasons provided by the weak conception of impartiality. If the strong 
account of impartiality, however, was not acceptable, then it would not provide reasons and 
the judgment about religious discrimination would alone be insufficient to over-ride the weak 
29 
 
conception of impartiality. This may very well turn out to be the case in this particular 
instance, but it would seem to be an amazing coincidence if it turned out that in every 
instance of a conflict between considered judgment and initial consideration, the reasons 
provided by the judgment are always by themselves insufficient to override those related to 
the initial consideration. Yet, if there were any instance in which the reason provided by the 
considered judgment was stronger, then some elements or group of elements in the system of 
beliefs would depend entirely on that judgment. This would make WRE conservative. One 
might object that this is not so as the considered judgment could be revised if a conflicting 
initial consideration which provided even stronger reasons was available. However, if this 
was sufficient to diffuse the charge of conservatism in this case, it would also be sufficient to 
diffuse the charge with respect to narrow reflective equilibrium. None of the considered 
judgments under narrow reflective equilibrium are unrevisable either. Any considered 
judgment can in principle be revised if doing so would improve the systematicity of the 
principles which explained them. Perhaps some other account of the permissible dialectical 
moves in WRE may not be so incoherent.  
On another account, the initial considerations are the chief determinant of choice of 
principles. Where background theories underdetermine principle choice by being compatible 
with multiple sets of initial considerations, considered judgments serve as a tie breaker. 
However, this implies that the reasons underlying the initial considerations are lexically prior 
in some sense to the reasons associated with the considered judgment about some case. One 
way in which this could make sense is if all the acceptable initial considerations relied on 
some analytic truth in addition to making some other claim while unacceptable ones were 
unacceptable precisely because they denied some claim which was analytically true.  
Consider the bare notion of impartiality. The weakest possible account of impartiality 
involves treating like cases alike. This requirement is trivial. It can be taken to be analytically 
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true that doing the right thing involves responding appropriately to the relevant features of the 
situation. If certain features, F of a situation require a particular response R, then any 
situation which has F requires R.  Thus, given two situations in which both have F, the 
appropriate response to each would be R. Thus it is right to treat similar cases similarly. This 
weakest account of impartiality says nothing about whether people are actually relevantly 
similar in certain ways. One weak way in which people could be thought to be relevantly 
similar is for their claims to be given equal consideration. If only people’s claims are given 
equal consideration, nothing prevents minority claims from being overridden by a vast 
majority. This, in certain situations, could license religious discrimination and corresponds 
with the thin Veil of Ignorance. A stronger account of people’s similarity would be everyone 
being owed equal treatment in some substantive sense. If people are to be treated equally in 
certain substantive ways in addition to giving everyone’s claims equal consideration, then 
this can result in a principle that forbids religious discrimination. This would seem to 
correspond to the thicker Veil of Ignorance. In this case, either account of impartiality is 
counted as acceptable because both are elaborations of the idea of treating like cases alike. If 
being an elaboration of a much weaker, analytically true proposition is all it takes for an 
initial consideration to count as acceptable, far too many candidate considerations become 
acceptable. In such a case, considered judgments about cases would play such a large role in 
determining the structure of the choice situation as well as the resultant principles that WRE 
would risk becoming too conservative. If something more was going on, then some general 
considered judgment was playing a role in making the initial consideration acceptable. Some 
initial consideration could be unacceptable even if it was an elaboration of a self evident 
proposition. In this case, what makes a particular consideration acceptable, is some high level 
considered judgment. However, this creates a problem. Under WRE, high level and low level 
considered judgments are treated asymmetrically. If the strong impartiality condition was 
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initially thought to be unacceptable, then even if only the strong impartiality condition 
yielded the thick Veil of Ignorance, no degree of salutary implications could render this 
initial constraint acceptable. If the fact that the thick Veil prevents religious discrimination 
made it the case that the strong impartiality condition was acceptable, WRE would be 
conservative. The judgment that religious discrimination is unjust would in fact be 
unrevisable. However, the mere fact that the weak impartiality condition results in a principle 
that allows religious discrimination does not make the weak impartiality constraint 
unacceptable. Yet even though both the high level judgment and the low level judgment are 
considered judgments and even though Rawls does not give any reason to think that the high 
level judgments are any more credible than the low level ones, Rawls treats them as such just 
so that WRE is not rendered conservative. However, treating one level of considered 
judgments as more credible than another level, when there is no reason to, is incoherent. 
Probing the Outer Limits 
Even if there was some way of coherently accounting for the various dialectical moves made 
under WRE, WRE may not be the best way to achieve our theoretical aims. Rawls’s 
theoretical aim, Independence of Moral Theory onwards, is to determine which conceptions 
or family of conceptions of justice could stably order a society characterised by reasonable 
pluralism. Any family of conceptions that can be derived from SDA represents the outer 
limits of convergence under WRE. It is possible that the extent of convergence under WRE 
may be even narrower than under SDA, but this cannot be established without instantiating a 
well ordered society in which everyone’s beliefs are in WRE2.  Moreover, there is no way to 
establish in what way WRE produces a greater extent of convergence than SDA. Consider 
that under SDA, we may pick out some family of conceptions C that represents the least 
                                                     
2
 Margaret Holmgren provides an excellent discussion on just this issue in her 1987 paper Wide Reflective 
Equilibrium and Objective Moral Truth. 
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possible extent of convergence possible under WRE. Suppose further that C consists of some 
finite set of conceptions C1 to C10. It may turn out that if everyone were to carry out WRE, 
people would converge to some subset of C. However, we cannot infer from the fact that one 
person arrives at one conception like C6 that C6 is within the narrower range of conceptions 
that would be picked out if everyone carries out WRE. The result of any one person carrying 
out WRE is only the set of conceptions that that person is willing to accept, not the set of 
conceptions that everyone is willing to accept. The chief worry seems to be that the family of 
conceptions C is too indeterminate to rule out various intuitively unacceptable conceptions.  
One way of filling out this worry is by noting that substantive conclusions cannot be obtained 
from mere considerations of meanings. For example, attending solely to the meaning of 
ordering does not inform on what factors can legitimately affect ordering. Rawls also states 
that questions about the transitivity and completeness of the ordering can depend on the state 
of moral theory at that moment. Similarly, the range of application of the publicity 
requirement is not obviously fixed. It can range from merely being about the principles of 
justice to the full derivation and background conceptions. The idea of publicity also ties in 
with the notion of stability. When the principles governing fundamental social institutions 
can stand up to public scrutiny, then such institutions are justified to everyone. The public 
articulation of the conceptions of persons which justify the principles governing social 
cooperation can also influence the way people conceive of themselves. And this in turn 
affects which principles and institutions they are willing to support. Two separate but related 
points are being made by Rawls. 
Rawls worries that a theory constructed from purely formal considerations would be too 
indeterminate since the premises themselves are non-selective. The use of considered 
judgments at all levels is thus aimed at obtaining principles which are selective without 
obviously selecting against conceptions which are currently widely held. A related worry is 
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that one cannot fill out the details of the formal conditions without knowing in advance the 
substantive conception of justice. Both of these worries have a rather simple solution. First, 
the social role of a conception of justice is specified in such a way that any theorist about 
justice would at least find the problem interesting even if they do not necessarily attach the 
word justice to said conception. Then, on this thin understanding of the social role of justice, 
spell out the various formal constraints on justice such that they are only as thick as they need 
to be so that any conception possessing these features is able to perform the social role of 
justice. If the initial constraints are too selective, people who endorse conceptions that such 
constraints select against will not be able to accept those constraints. Selective constraints 
must themselves be grounded in either logical or nomological necessity in order to justify 
selectivity. Any alternative would thus beg the question against these rival theories. That is 
why it is important that the initial considerations be as non-selective as possible. One cannot 
have been said to justify anything to another if the other can and does coherently reject the 
starting points of the argument. Any selectivity must be fully justified by arguments from self 
evident or empirically well grounded premises where appropriate. As I will argue in the next 
chapter, many of the considerations Rawls invokes are too restrictive. As I will also show, the 
stability requirement, when combined with the fact of reasonable pluralism, has the potential 
to become significantly selective, but this selectiveness can be justified because investigating 
the stability of conceptions is itself the goal of enquiry. In fact, much, if not all, of the 
selectivity of the OP springs from the requirement that a conception of justice is to order a 
pluralistic society such that it is stable for the right reasons. However, ultimately, the best 
reply to the indeterminacy worry is to show that this is not the case. As I will show in the 




Chapter 3: Initial Constraints and the Arguments for the Various Features 
The chief worry, when it comes to selectivity, is that the OP, and hence the considerations 
that underlie it will only be acceptable to those who already accept those principles. It is with 
the aim of assuaging such a worry that I pare down as far as I can the various initial 
considerations that Rawls employs in arguing for the OP. 
Social Contract theory and Hypothetical Contracts  
In this section, I explore Dworkin’s and Scanlon’s criticism of Rawls’s Original Position and 
I will show how it rests on a misinterpretation of Rawls. One fairly intuitive criticism of the 
OP is that a hypothetical contract cannot be binding. Dworkin argues that hypothetical 
agreements cannot be binding because they are “no sort of agreement at all” (Dworkin 1973, 
p501) and that the OP is doubly hypothetical: first, in that the agreement did not take place 
and secondly, in that the conditions under which the agreement took place hides information 
in such a way that it cannot even be said that the principles are in everyone’s actual interests 
(Dworkin 1973, pp503-505). Scanlon echoes Dworkin in this and, like Dworkin (Dworkin 
1973, p501), argues that the agreement in the OP itself has no moral force. Scanlon tries to 
show that what would be chosen in the OP and what cannot be reasonably rejected can come 
apart. Scanlon argues that it is possible that the principle of average utility would be chosen 
in the OP. However the principle of average utility can be reasonably rejected when it 
involves large sacrifices to the interests of the few in exchange for minute gains for the many. 
Then, since what, according to Scanlon, really justifies a principle is that no one would 
reasonably reject it, agreement from the OP cannot justify the principles so chosen. (Scanlon 
1982, pp122-123) More generally, what really justifies the principles of justice is that they 
are fair or cannot be reasonably rejected and that the OP neither adds nor subtracts anything 
from these considerations. 
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Brudney locates the above lack of moral force attributed to choice situations with Veils of 
Ignorance in the lack of any connection between the persons behind the Veil and those 
outside of it. Allegedly, the Veil of Ignorance makes it unclear whether or not the principle 
chosen applied to any actual person. He argues further that while this applied to Harsanyi’s 
contract situation, Rawls’s is exempt from such a criticism because he employs a moralised 
conception of the person according to which people have a highest order interest in the 
development and exercise of their two moral powers. Brudney argues that the moral force of 
the OP depends on the moral force of the conception of the person and concludes that insofar 
as the conception of the person realistically applies to a person, so do the principles generated 
by the OP (Brudney 1991, pp247-251). 
The reply by Brudney, however, seems problematic. In order for Brudney’s account to be fair 
to both Rawls and Harsanyi, their account of what a person’s interests are must be 
substantively different in such a way that Rawls’s account is more morally attractive than 
Harsanyi’s. But, if Rawls does no more than take people’s interests as given by their existing 
preferences or even their most rationally coherent preferences, then there is no difference 
from what Harsanyi takes to be the relevant interest (Harsanyi 1955, p320). But, once 
Rawls’s thin theory of the good is interpreted as requiring more than just the ordering of 
means to fit the ends, it ceases to be thin anymore. It becomes thick enough to exclude some 
conceptions of the good as unacceptable. To the extent that the conception of the highest 
order interests is not so thick as to exclude some conceptions of the good, it is not clear how 
Brudney can non-arbitrarily make an exception to the criticism he makes against hypothetical 
consent theories in general. 
Stark makes a different counterargument to the Dworkin-Scanlon thesis. Stark argues that the 
problem with the Dworkin-Scanlon thesis or the standard indictment as she calls it is that it 
wrongly supposes that the idealised agents choose the principles of justice because they are 
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the correct principles of justice. Rather, she argues, the principles of that would be chosen are 
the principles of justice because they are chosen from within the OP. The OP allegedly 
models the appropriate way to reason about justice (Stark 2000, pp326-328). Because it does 
this, the appropriate constraints on reasoning about justice are not incidental to the OP, but 
are integral to it.  This supports the Bridging principle outlined above. The relevant sense in 
which people would be agreeing to a conception of justice is the case where there are non 
accidental features of such conceptions which give them reason to accept that conception. 
But, it is a further question whether any hypothetical choice situation actually models these 
reasons well. Only if there is at least one hypothetical choice situation that can accurately 
model these reasons does it make sense to discuss what features such a device may have. 
Society as a system of cooperation 
Rawls’s development of the idea of social cooperation is problematic primarily because it 
folds into one idea what are two distinct assumptions. This results in Rawls’s argument 
failing to distinguish between what is required to make a conception of justice coherent and 
what is required to make that conception of justice acceptable to all in a society characterised 
by reasonable pluralism. I will argue that there are good reasons to start off with the idea of 
coordination instead of cooperation. To that end, I will, firstly, argue against the inclusion of 
all three ideas under the rubric of cooperation. Then I will provide an argument showing that 
whatever else it is, society is a system of coordination. 
One worry about relying on the idea of socially coordinated activity is that there is nothing 
intrinsically just about coordinated activity. Orders issued by an absolute central authority 
may just as (or even more) likely contain unjust and oppressive social rules as rules that are 
acceptable to all. However, we may still ask why we should care about rules that are 
acceptable to all? What if people in a particular society, either through perversity or false 
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consciousness, did not accept the morally correct rules and procedures? The first question 
highlights the way in which different conceptions of justice respond to what Rawls calls the 
circumstances of justice. The circumstances of justice are characterised by a moderate 
scarcity and the burdens of judgment such that people advance different proposals as to what 
rules and procedures are to regulate their conduct (Rawls 1999, pp109-110). Thus, one 
fundamental aspect of the circumstances of justice, specified minimally, is a failure to 
coordinate. In fact, one might usefully stipulate that the circumstances are whatever material 
circumstances make it such that people make conflicting claims against one another and all 
conceptions of justice address this failure by recommending principles, rules and procedures 
to settle the conflicting claims people advance against one another. That the rules are to be 
acceptable to those subject to them is a further claim. Moreover, and ironically, the notion 
that the principles of justice are to be acceptable to all, itself, may not necessarily be 
acceptable to all.  
Of course, there is in fact a good argument for the widespread acceptability claim. One 
reason why widespread acceptability is a practical requirement of social rules is that where 
social rules are not acceptable, people will tend to persist in advancing claims that conflict 
with others. If a conception of justice is to have any hope of resolving the conflicting claims 
people advance against one another at a practical level, it must provide reasons to people to 
accept and abide by the principles specified therein. Moreover, these reasons must be 
intimately connected with people’s own beliefs and commitments. Admittedly, this is a 
difficult issue to finesse and I lack the space to do full justice to it. At the very least even if 
not everyone accepts that the principles of justice are to be acceptable to all, it is necessarily 
the case that everyone has good reason to accept a conception of justice which is acceptable 
to all. The upshot of keeping the claims separate even when they are both justified is that this 
allows us to keep separate what is required by the idea that conceptions of justice coordinate 
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behaviour and what is required by the idea that conceptions of justice are to be acceptable to 
those subject to such rules and procedures that follow from it. i.e. it allows us to separate 
what is required by the concept of justice and what is required by conceptions that are to be 
acceptable to all. 
The second idea which Rawls wishes to incorporate under the idea of cooperation is that of 
reciprocity. The difficulty with including the idea of reciprocity is that it is not clear what role 
the idea of reciprocity has in determining the features of the OP. Certainly, Rawls thought 
that the difference principle was a form of reciprocity (Rawls 2001, p49). To be sure, the 
informal argument in favour of the difference principle can be based on the idea of 
reciprocity. That, however, does not show that Rawls needs it to justify the OP. Thus, as it 
stands, the idea that the terms of cooperation are to be accepted only if everyone else accepts 
it may or may not be widely acceptable. If it is not acceptable, then hitching it to the idea of 
cooperation would be a mistake. If it is widely acceptable and relevant, it can be introduced 
separately. This issue will be further explored later. 
The third idea that Rawls incorporates under the idea of cooperation is that of a person’s 
rational advantage. However, the notion of rational advantage that Rawls uses is 
individualistic. It suggests, at the very least, that an individual’s advantage or good is prior to 
the good or advantage of the community. Only if there is some sense in which an individual’s 
good is prior to the community can people’s goods conflict. However if this priority was 
reversed, then people’s goods cannot truly conflict. To illustrate I will borrow Fred Miller’s 
account of a holistic conception of the good. 
It is good for the individual to be F in so far as it is good for the polis that the 
individual be F (Miller 1997, p197) 
39 
 
For instance, while it may seem to be the case that a thief who steals some money and gets 
away with it is better off in virtue of thereby obtaining more money, on a holist’s view, since 
society is harmed by the theft, the thief is also harmed. The thief’s perception that he benefits 
by the theft is illusory. On an Aristotelian view, since the good life is at least partly 
constituted by living virtuously, a person who acts unjustly also thereby becomes worse off. 
Thus, on a holist view, an apparent sacrifice for the common good, as when a soldier jumps 
on a grenade to save his platoon, is also to the benefit of the person who makes that 
“sacrifice”. Such a view can be attributed to Plato as detailed in the fourth book of the 
Republic. The character, Socrates, argues that giving weight to people’s preferences in excess 
of what would be to the benefit of the state would result in people shirking their duties 
towards the state and thus its corruption. Socrates thus argues for treating the happiness of the 
state as a whole as primary and each person’s good as derivative of that. 
 If this were the case, it would be incoherent to say that it is good for the polis that an 
individual A is FA and another individual B is FB if A being FA is incompatible with B being 
FB. If we cannot rank which is better for the polis, then it is indeterminate which is good for 
the polis. Thus, it is indeterminate whether it is good for A to be FA or good for B to be FB. It 
cannot be the case that it is good for A to be FA and for A to be not-FA. Even supposing that it 
could be ranked, a conflict cannot happen. Suppose it is good for the polis that A is FA but 
even better that B is FB. That would imply that it is good for A to be FA but even better for A 
to be not-FA. It would not be rational for A to want to be FA since he would be better off if he 
were not-FA. Thus under holistic conceptions of the good, people’s goods cannot conflict. A 
conception of a person’s advantage, where their goods can and do conflict, thus excludes 
holistic conceptions of the good. I will call this the holist’s objection. To be clear, the holist 
does not object to saying that people have interests or a good. Nor does he object to the idea 
that people are more likely to accept basic structures in which they are able to pursue their 
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conceptions of the good to a greater extent. Holists object to the idea that there can be a 
genuine conflict of interests between persons.3 This does not mean that they deny that claims 
can conflict, only that it is not in a person’s interest to push a claim beyond what would be 
good for society as a whole. This latter distinction is important as this allows the holist to 
account for the circumstances of justice. The holist merely distinguishes between what people 
claim is in their interest and what is genuinely in their interest. 
One possible reply to this objection is that while the holistic account may even possibly be a 
true account of the good, the notion of rational advantage refers to the extent that each person 
is able to successfully pursue his own conception of the good regardless of whether that 
conception is ‘true’. Thus, a holistic conception of the good is just one more conception of 
the good that people may possess. This reply, however, seems a bit too quick. It seems that 
Rawls still individualises, perhaps in a way incompatible with communitarians’ sensibilities. 
Rawls writes that “The absolutely best for any man is that everyone else should join with him 
in furthering his conception of the good whatever it turns out to be” (Rawls 1999, p103). But, 
holists like Plato would instead argue that the absolute best for any man is what he would 
need to have in order for the state to be healthy. Holism of this sort, even if somewhat 
counterintuitive, cannot be ruled out in advance unless it can be shown that it relies on 
contradictory premises or empirically untenable claims. 
If the OP is to be justified even to holists, there must be some way to present the idea that 
each person can be advantaged in a way that is completely neutral between all conceptions of 
the good and justice. There must further be a way to present the idea that the acceptability of 
a conception of justice depends on the extent it allows the pursuit of one’s conception of the 
                                                     
3
 Of course, Holists are not the only ones to make this claim. Individualists like Ayn Rand also argue, if less 
successfully, that rational interests cannot conflict (Rand 1962, pp46-52). More generally, we may say that more 
positivist conceptions of interest allow that people’s interests may conflict while more moralized notions 
suppose that they cannot. 
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good and on the reasons it presents for the way it resolves conflicting claims. In the fourth 
chapter, I will argue that the basis for a valid claim can be disaggregated and associated with 
persons in ways that is compatible with both holists and individualists. I will also argue that 
with few exceptions we cannot exclude at the outset any potential basis for a valid claim.  
To say that society is a system of coordination just is to say that that society is not just a 
collection of persons, but a group of persons whose interactions are governed by the same set 
of basic rules. An examination of society reveals a basic truth: there are many situations 
where people can and do make claims against each other. People decide to take actions and 
effect states of affairs and other people’s actions can affect the outcome or even whether or 
not the action can be performed. In such cases, people make claims against others. They 
demand that others perform one action rather than another or that they refrain from acting. 
Similarly, those others advance a counter claim against the first group that the latter not make 
such claims against them.  
These situations can now result in an impasse; both claims cannot be simultaneously 
satisfied. Social rules solve this by providing clear instructions to each party in this conflict. 
The conflict is resolved because the rule tells one person to withdraw his claim and the other 
to push his/her claim if he/she wanted to. If one were to examine the concept of a society, it 
can be seen that for any group of people one would wish to call a society, most conflicts 
between people would have to be resolved. Thus, whatever else society may be, it is required 
to be minimally a system of coordination.  
Formal Constraints on the Right 
Rawls proposes to justify the initial constraints on reasoning by checking whether the 
resultant theory is sound. However, this seems mistaken. How else can one assess the 
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soundness of a theory without checking the validity of the inference from the constraints and 
the antecedent correctness4 of the constraint? Moreover, if my earlier criticism of reflective 
equilibrium stands, relying on the agreeableness of the outcome to justify the supporting 
premises would be a mistake. I will show how the generality constraint is suspect and how 
the argument for the Veil of Ignorance derived from it is unsuccessful. I will also address the 
publicity constraint and show how, with suitable modifications, it can be supported by the 
account of stability.  
Generality and the Veil of Ignorance   
Principles are general to the extent that they exclude proper names and rigged definite 
descriptions. Yet, Rawls himself admits that there are philosophical difficulties with the 
concept of generality (Rawls 1999, p113). Though not explicitly stated, I presume that the 
difficulties mentioned relate to two kinds of questions. Firstly, why should principles exclude 
proper names and rigged definite descriptions? This is perhaps, the lesser difficulty. It is 
certainly an existing part of our current moral practice and on that basis it may be argued that 
any putative principle which includes proper names and rigged definite descriptions is not 
eligible for being a bona-fide principle of justice. However, such a move may be problematic. 
There are many beliefs, like the idea that slavery and racism are wrong, which are taken to be 
part of our moral practice. Yet it does not necessarily follow that any conception which 
entailed the permissibility of slavery and racism was no moral conception at all. After all, it 
seems more natural to say that people who used to believe that slavery was permissible were 
subscribing to a mistaken moral doctrine and did not deny the applicability of morality 
altogether. 
                                                     
4
 I would like to distinguish between correctness and truth. Pace Rawls, there is some difficulty with the notion 
of truth as applied to moral statements. Correctness is broader than truth and applies to statements which are not 
truth apt. Where it does apply to truth apt statements, correctness is just truth, but there may be alternate criteria 
for the correctness of statements in cases where truth is not apt and those will have to be specified. We can thus 
bypass questions of truth and focus on mere correctness. 
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Bernard Williams mounts another argument in favour of the generality condition. Williams 
argues that a first-person dictatorship (FPD), which is excluded by the generality condition, 
cannot be supported by reasons that would count as moral. Williams invokes the example of 
an egoist, Caligula, considering self interested conduct which is harmful to others. Supposing 
the egoist says that it is alright for Caligula to perform that action but not alright for anyone 
else, Williams argues that this raises an inescapable question; “what makes you (Caligula) so 
special?” Williams supposes that answers to this question fall into two categories. The first 
type would invoke some more general principle. For example if the answer to why Caligula is 
so special is that he is the emperor of Rome, this would refer to the more general principle 
that it is alright for the emperor of Rome to harm others for his own benefit. The other 
category of explanations, Williams argues, provides inadequate grounds for justification. 
Suppose Caligula were to answer “I am me”, it would seem that another egoist Charles could 
very well also reply “I am me” in defence of his own self interested conduct which would 
harm others. Yet, we would not be able to tell why Caligula’s reply is acceptable and 
Charles’s is not. This failure presumably shows that FPD is not impartial and thus fails to 
qualify as any sort of moral conception in the first place. 
It is, however, not clear if the “I am me” reply genuinely violates impartiality. There are, 
plausibly, a number of different interpretations of what the impartiality condition requires. 
This can generally be thought of as treating like cases alike. Taken as a purely formal 
requirement, treating like cases alike makes no commitments as to which features are the 
relevant features according to which cases must be alike in order to merit like treatment. 
Other conceptions of impartiality build more into what it means to treat like cases alike. They 
could include substantive commitments to whether particular features are relevant or not. 
However, since there is substantive moral content built into these latter notions of impartiality 
it is less likely that such a conception is built into the very concept of justice.  
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Consider the idea that a person’s talents are a morally relevant feature. If this were indeed the 
case, it would be permissible or even required that we treat people with different talents 
differently. If considerations of which features are morally relevant were built into the 
concept of justice, then if talent were morally relevant, any conception which regarded talent 
as morally arbitrary would not even count as a conception of justice. Similarly if talents were 
indeed morally arbitrary any conception which considered them morally relevant would not 
be a conception of justice. In fact there could ultimately be only one coherent conception of 
justice. All other supposed conceptions of justice would either not count as conceptions of 
justice in virtue of not treating the morally relevant features as relevant or would be 
incoherent by making some kind of logical error. Escaping this consequence involves either 
using the purely formal account of impartiality or providing an account of impartiality in 
which some facts about moral relevance are built into the account of impartiality and other 
features are not. In the Caligula case, this may involve supposing that the property of being 
Caligula was not morally relevant and that thus was implicit in our concept of justice. 
Furthermore, this restriction would apply not just to Caligula, but to all persons. The property 
of being any specific person would have to be morally arbitrary, and that this fact would be 
built into the conception of impartiality. Questions about whether other features like 
possessing a talent were morally arbitrary would, on the other hand, not be built into the 
conception of impartiality regardless of the answers to such questions. The question as to 
why some facts about moral relevance are to be included in the notion of impartiality while 
others are not will also have to be justified. 
The above argument is not necessarily sufficient to establish that only the formal and minimal 
notion of impartiality is built into the concept of justice. It is, however, sufficient to motivate 
scepticism about the idea that something more substantive than formal impartiality is 
constitutive of the concept of justice. Given a purely formal notion of impartiality, the “I am 
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me” reply does not imply dissimilar treatment of similar cases. In this case, if it was a brute 
metaphysical fact that Caligula was special or sui generis, then Caligula would be relevantly 
different in such a way that his interests mattered more. One may object that this relies on a 
more fundamental and principle that those who are special are to be treated better. However, 
this need not be the case. It is possible for the way in which Caligula is to be treated to be 
irreducibly bound up in the way in which Caligula is sui generis. Since it is irreducible in this 
way, there need be no further principle that explains what makes Caligula special. Moreover, 
the principle of treating like cases alike cannot itself count as a more fundamental principle 
that makes the conception general as that would render all conceptions trivially general, even 
first-person dictatorships. Yet clearly, Rawls conceives of the generality condition as 
excluding such conceptions. Since it is somewhat doubtful that there is any substantive 
content to the notion of impartiality and the purely formal conception of impartiality cannot 
exclude at least some non-general doctrines, supposing that generality constrains what 
conceptions count as conceptions of justice is at the very least a problematic assumption. An 
argument for the OP that did not rely on generality would be a significant improvement. 
The argument for the Veil of Ignorance that I outlined is that it hides morally irrelevant 
information in order to prevent the parties from choosing principles that violate the generality 
or impartiality constraints. There are two problems, however, with this argument. The first 
relates to the problem of how to differentiate between relevant and irrelevant features from 
the standpoint of justice. The second problem pertains to whether the Veil of Ignorance really 
does prevent the parties from choosing non-general principles. 
Admittedly, the idea that everyone is morally equal is implicit in the public political culture 
of democratic societies. Oddly enough, while this would be a premise that is plausibly 
implicit in the public political culture of a democratic society, this is not the sense in which 
Rawls supposes that people consider themselves to be equals. Rawls’s account of equality is 
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that people are understood as possessing the two moral powers to the requisite minimum 
extent necessary to engage in social cooperation (Rawls 1996, p79). The sense in which 
people are to regard one another as equals if they are to be situated symmetrically is thus 
distinct from the sense of equality Rawls attributes to them. I will call the first notion of 
equality, namely the idea that everything else being equal, the fact that a person possesses a 
particular feature is no more morally relevant than another person possessing that feature, 
equality qua moral object. By contrast, the notion of equality that Rawls invokes, namely that 
people possess the two moral powers to the requisite minimum degree, is equality qua moral 
subject.  
Moreover, it is doubtful if this account of equality is in fact part of the public political culture 
of a liberal democracy. Arguably, people in democratic societies often feel free to legislate 
their personal morality on dissenting others. Political disputes over gay rights in many 
democratic societies show how people do not think that dissenting others possess equal moral 
authority. I will argue that these two senses of equality are logically distinct. One does not 
necessarily entail the other. 
While it is perhaps unlikely that people with diverse conceptions of the good would agree to 
treat people unequally qua moral objects, nothing logically precludes them from doing so if 
there was an overlapping consensus on such inegalitarian terms. That it is unrealistic is beside 
the point. What is important is that the two are conceptually distinct. Given that the two are 
conceptually distinct and given that Rawls starts from the notion of equality qua moral 
subject, the role of generality constraint seems superfluous. Principles need not be general in 
order that choice in the OP picks out the principles of justice. Moreover, if it turns out that 
principles that are chosen will be general, then generality need not be assumed in advance. 
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However, this may seem like a trivial point. After all it is not implausible to assume equality 
qua moral objects. Moreover there may very well be a parallel argument from equality qua 
moral subject in favour of the Veil of Ignorance that could be constructed. That argument 
would proceed in the following way. Since no one has more moral authority than anyone 
else, the identity of the person ought not to have any relevance on whether that person’s 
claim is valid. In order to prevent personal identity from affecting the outcome of the 
deliberation process, such information is blocked from the parties.  
Both arguments have a similar structure. Personal information is deemed irrelevant and such 
information is excluded in order to prevent the parties from relying on that information. This 
presumes that there would be something wrong with the way the parties would choose if 
there were no Veil of Ignorance. Rawls, in particular, was concerned that such facts could be 
used to obtain an unfair bargaining advantage by some, presumably those with better 
prospects, over others (Freeman 2006, pp156-157) and thus obtain principles which were 
partial to themselves. I will contend that a careful analysis of a choice situation without any 
Veil of Ignorance will reveal that no bargaining advantage let alone an unfair one is possible 
even without the Veil of Ignorance. 
Without a Veil of Ignorance, there are three possibilities. The first possibility is that there is 
no difference in result between what happens with the Veil and what happens without. The 
second is that there will be no agreement at any level. The third possibility is that there will 
be some agreement but it would be a different set of principles that would be agreed to. I will 
set aside the first possibility for now. The two arguments in favour of the Veil of Ignorance 
ignore this possibility. The second possibility could take place if each person chooses the 
principles that best promote his or her own interests according to the conception of the good 
that he or she will hold and goes no further. Or perhaps even if they wished to come to an 
agreement, they would each individually have no incentive to compromise as they could hope 
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to hold out longer. Either way there would be some complete failure to agree on any set of 
principles of justice. When there is a complete failure to agree on any principle of justice, this 
could be taken either as a sign that a basic structure where anything goes is chosen or no 
basic structure is said to be preferable over any other. In the first, there is no advantage to be 
had by those who would tend to be better off in most basic structures as none of the benefits 
of social cooperation would be obtained. Whatever the shortfalls of such a situation, it cannot 
be said to be partial to anyone. It would be impartially bad to everyone. If the latter, talking 
about a bargaining advantage does not make sense as there is no particular conclusion that 
might be favoured. A bargaining advantage only makes sense if the agreement thereby 
reached is favourable to at least the advantaged party. If one basic structure is as good as 
another then no advantage is given by such personal information since there is no determinate 
principle which would pick out an advantaging or disadvantaging arrangement.  
Suppose, instead, that an agreement of at least some determinacy could be reached. Since the 
concern is with agreements, situations where some majority force their preference on a 
minority can be excluded by stipulation. In this, the only way in which agreement can be 
reached is if the parties reason that since agreement has to be reached, they ought not to 
propose principles which would not be acceptable to some. If they persisted in doing so, they 
would be unable to come to agreement and that would be very bad according to their own 
conception of the good. In addition, even if the specific conceptions of justice that any one 
party picks out is not identical to the conception any other pricks out, the two parties can be 
said to agree on the various points of similarity all those distinct conceptions of justice share. 
This brings to the fore two points. Firstly, even when there is no Veil of Ignorance, none of 
the principles that could be agreed to would be unacceptable to anyone. This diffuses claims 
about the substantive unfairness or partiality of the outcomes of such a process. It can 
generally be supposed that principles which are unacceptable to some but not to others are 
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partial towards those who prefer those principles. If all principles that are unacceptable to 
someone are excluded, one of the key indicators of partiality is not present. While it is 
possible that the acceptable subset of conceptions of justice is still biased in some way, it is 
difficult to point out how without begging the question about what impartiality requires. In 
fact, it is difficult to see how the principles chosen without a Veil of Ignorance would differ 
significantly from the principles chosen under a thick Veil. Presumably, what drives the 
choice under a thick Veil of Ignorance is that since parties do not know the probability with 
which they may end up occupying a particular social position or possess some specific 
conception of the good, they will not risk choosing a conception of justice that is 
unacceptable to someone in that position or who possesses that conception of the good. By 
hypothesis, if a person finds himself in a position where some of his basic liberties are 
abridged or if he is deprived of some basic opportunities or where he is so poor that he cannot 
access basic necessities or for that matter fully participate in society, he would not accept the 
conception of justice that puts him in such a wretched position. Rawls’s claim about the two 
principles is that his two principles of justice are the only principles under which no one 
occupies an unacceptable social position. If this last claim is indeed the case, then even 
without a Veil of Ignorance, everyone will know that any set of principles other than Rawls’s 
two would be rejected by someone, while those two would not be rejected by anyone. It 
follows then that those principles are what would be chosen in a choice situation which is 
identical to the OP except that it lacks a Veil of Ignorance. If Rawls’s principles are not 
chosen in the choice situation without the Veil, the very same considerations that make it the 
case that those principles would not be chosen also count against them being chosen in the 
OP. 
Secondly, if the consequences of not coming to an agreement are more or less equally 
horrible for all persons, then the best alternative to negotiated agreement (BATNA) is more 
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or less equal for all persons and there are no significant bargaining advantages. Someone has 
a bargaining advantage if and only if there is a difference in BATNA. When someone has a 
higher BATNA, that person everything else being equal, has less incentive to compromise 
and will thus tend to hold out longer and to a greater extent. There are at least two aspects to 
BATNA. One is related to the relative scarcity of alternative contractors. The other is related 
to the goods a person enjoys absent a successful agreement. If one party has more alternative 
parties to contract with, then that person has a bargaining advantage because he or she can, to 
a greater extent, afford to not compromise and risk the other party walking away. Similarly, 
when a person already has more goods, that person can afford to hold out to a greater extent 
and thus risk alienating the other party in order to get more favourable terms. However, 
neither condition holds in the contract situation even when there is no Veil of Ignorance.  
Firstly, there are no alternative contractors. Thus neither side has a scarcity advantage. This 
would be true regardless of the relative frequencies of persons in particular groups. Even 
when one finds oneself in a distinct minority, there are still going to be proposals that one 
finds unacceptable. Moreover, even within the range of acceptable principles, there is no 
particular reason why a rational mutually disinterested party would be more willing to hold 
out just because there are more people whose preferences (for principles of justice) resemble 
his. This would require that everyone antecedently accept some kind of majoritarian norm. If 
there was only one hold out, that person may find it fruitful to agree with everyone else so 
long as the principles agreed to are not unacceptable. However, as long as there is more than 
one person who disagrees with the majority, even if the principles the majority agree on are 
not unacceptable, that person has no more reason to accede to the majority than any of the 
majority have to agree with the principles the minority prefer. Since as stipulated, the parties 
are only concerned with how they fare with respect to their own conception of the good, the 
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fact that there are others who share the same preference ordering of principles would not 
affect their willingness to hold out. 
The second aspect of BATNA gets a bit more complicated. Rawls does not explicitly specify 
a state of nature which would serve as a baseline for the purpose of comparison. If it is 
simply stipulated that they have to agree and there is no baseline, then there is no alternative 
to negotiated agreement and thus no BATNA. Thus, there is no bargaining advantage. If there 
is a baseline, that baseline will be bad. It will be one in which anything goes and social 
coordination does not happen. There cannot be antecedent norms or natural rights which 
order social relations as the point of the contract situation is to justify the fundamental norms 
governing a society. Those norms cannot be assumed antecedently if they are to be justified. 
If the contract situation is to model the principles that govern the distribution of the gains of 
social coordination, then the baseline cannot be anything but a situation without any social 
coordination. For Rawls, what people could get on their own pales in comparison to what 
they could get from social coordination. Much of the gains of trade, skilled labour and the 
exercise of developed talents are only possible with social cooperation. While there may very 
well be some advantages that those who are stronger or quicker could obtain in such a pre-
social situation, such advantages are meagre when compared with the gains from social 
cooperation. If this is the case, then any bargaining advantage would be negligible. Thus, 
given that there are no bargaining advantages, no unfair bargaining advantages may be 
obtained even if there was no Veil of Ignorance. The Veil, therefore, is not necessary to 
exclude non-general principles or even those that are only acceptable to some from being 
chosen.  
In fact, simply by substituting a suitable conception of the person, the choice situation can be 
constructed such that non-general principles would be chosen from behind the Veil of 
Ignorance. For instance if we supposed that serving Caligula’s will was in people’s highest 
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order interests, then the resulting principles that would be chosen would recommend a first 
person dictatorship even when there is a Veil of Ignorance. The Veil is thus not sufficient to 
exclude non-general conceptions of justice or conceptions only acceptable to some from 
being chosen. Since any coherent conception of justice could be generated by providing an 
appropriate account of the HOI, the veil must be consistent with all those conceptions of 
justice. Therefore, no argument for the veil can employ premises that are substantive. A 
premise is substantive if presupposing it selects some conceptions of justice over others. Thus 
no substantive premise can be used to justify the Veil of Ignorance. Only purely formal 
premises which are consistent with any coherent conception of justice are necessary and 
sufficient to justify the Veil. 
The nature of the parties behind the Veil 
Even if the above objection to Rawls’s argument is unsuccessful, it may be that Rawls’s 
argument for the Veil of Ignorance is problematic if it fails to cohere with his account of the 
nature of the parties. Suppose it were to be taken for granted that one’s own personal identity 
and characteristics are not morally relevant. As mentioned above, the purpose of the Veil of 
Ignorance is to prevent the parties from utilising such information in their reasoning. Suppose 
we were to accept this argument, one of the questions this arises is how this account of the 
Veil of Ignorance fits in with the account of the other features of the OP. Take, for instance, 
the nature of the parties behind the Veil. Why should the parties be rational and mutually 
disinterested? 
One of the reasons for the parties being mutually disinterested is that it abstracts away from 
people’s propensity to cede claims even when they have no obligation to do so. How does 
abstracting away from this propensity translate to parties who are mutually disinterested? 
Presumably abstracting away from this propensity would present the full force of the claim. 
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However, this could only be the case if the moral force of the claim was, at least on the face 
of it, proportionate to the utility the parties would gain by the satisfaction of the claim. If this 
were not the case the parties would end up choosing principles which did not respond 
adequately to the morally relevant considerations. Thus, in order for the principles chosen by 
the parties to be the principles of justice, the considerations that drive the parties’ preference 
ordering must only be the morally relevant considerations. Morally irrelevant considerations 
would, if they influenced the preference ordering of conceptions of justice, result in a 
preference ordering that did not reflect the morally relevant reasons. However, since a 
rational mutually disinterested party, absent a Veil of Ignorance is only concerned about the 
highest order interests of the person she represents, she cannot be responsive to all the moral 
reasons. That is to say, the moral reasons that she is responsive to, whatever those may be are 
only a narrow subset of the totality of moral reasons. The Veil of Ignorance causes some 
information which is deemed to not be morally relevant is withheld from them in order to 
prevent them from utilising this in their reasoning. Yet clearly, if we are to regard the 
principles so chosen as appropriately justified by the full set of relevant moral reasons, it 
must be shown that the choice in the OP is driven by all the relevant moral reasons. The 
choice by a party who is motivated by only a subset of moral reasons and is screened from 
morally irrelevant information is not necessarily driven by all the relevant reasons. The mere 
fact that the Veil of Ignorance prevents the parties from invoking morally irrelevant 
considerations is insufficient to show that the choice the parties make is responsive to all and 
only the morally relevant considerations. 
Still, it is clearly the case that the OP forces the parties to take an interest in how others fare 
for instrumental reasons. However, this is itself a distinct reason from preventing the parties 
from using irrelevant considerations in their deliberation about principles. In order to secure 
their own prospects vis a vis her conception of the good, the parties have to ensure that 
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everyone’s prospects are secured because the Veil of Ignorance prevents them from knowing 
who they represent. Clearly, the argument that the Veil of Ignorance (together with mutually 
disinterested parties) is required because having a prima facie concern for how each 
representative person fairs is the proper response to all the available moral reasons is distinct 
from the argument that the Veil of Ignorance prevents the party from utilising morally 
arbitrary information. Moreover, the former cannot be derived from the latter. This is not to 
say that the argument that having a prima facie concern with the prospects of all 
representative persons is appropriate cannot be made. I will in fact make this argument in the 
fourth chapter. However, once it is made, a more parsimonious account of the Veil of 
Ignorance and the nature of the parties presents itself. 
This involves exploring the idea that the Veil of Ignorance necessarily has no effect on the 
choice of principles. I will give a brief overview of the argument which I will subsequently 
expand on in the fourth chapter. Presuming that having a prima facie concern for the 
prospects of all persons is the appropriate response to the full set of moral reasons, a choice 
situation consisting of parties motivated in such a way would necessarily choose the 
principles best supported by the relevant moral reasons. Since each party would 
independently choose the same set of moral principles regardless of the identity or particular 
features of the persons they represent, such information can be ignored without affecting the 
outcome of the choice situation. The Veil of Ignorance thus serves as a simplificatory device. 
When the Veil of Ignorance is imposed, the parties’ disposition is also simultaneously 
reduced to being rational and mutually disinterested. The upshot of this argument is that it 
does not rely on a generality premise. Nor does it rely on any conception of moral equality. 




Rawls requires at the second level of publicity that people agree on a range of social theories 
and facts. However, social theories can often be complex and the burdens of judgment can 
cause people to make mistakes even when the correct answer is publicly available. Not 
everyone is willing and able to allocate the time and resources to investigate deeply a number 
of various theories. Rawls can unproblematically weaken this condition without any cost. If 
Rawls allows, at the third level of publicity, that the full justification for the conception of 
justice be publicly available but not necessarily known by everyone, then nothing is lost if the 
general social facts upon which the justification is based are also publicly available even if 
not known by everyone. 
Another problem arises if publicity also requires an affirmation of political values over and 
above the acceptance of the principles of justice. One worry is that such a condition even if 
well argued for is not innocuous. It would seem to immediately disqualify rule utilitarian 
conceptions of justice. Under some versions of consequentialism (Sidgwick 1907, pp489-
490), rules which if widely accepted would maximise utility are devised. People comply with 
these rules and refrain from trying to directly maximise aggregate utility. On the other hand 
legislators are conscious of the “real” justification for these rules and devise the rules 
accordingly. The deeper theory justifying these rules is itself not publicisable. At the very 
least, it would have to be shown that such a level of publicity is required by reasons even 
such utilitarians are willing to accept. 
The third level of publicity requires that all the arguments presented in the full view; 
inclusive of those for and from the OP be publicly available. Similarly, it could also refer to 
the argument for the OP that I will offer in the fourth chapter. What is more puzzling is what 
is meant by being made available to the public. Rawls says that this full justification is 
“present in the public culture, reflected in its system of law and political institutions” (Rawls 
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1993, p67). It is not clear what it means for the full justification to be present in the public 
culture. One component of this could be that the basic ideas as well as the considered 
judgments from which the conception is worked up towards are already found latent in the 
public culture. These premises, themselves, however do not constitute the argument for 
justice as fairness. Perhaps it is also required that the argument from premises found in the 
public culture to the conception of justice be found in a book or paper which is readily 
available in book stores at affordable prices. It would be rather odd to ask for more than this. 
It seems at the very least impractical to incorporate the full justification in the constitution or 
for judges to regularly invoke it in their decisions. What seems crucial about the third level of 
publicity is whether the premises for the full justification of the conception of justice are 
acceptable to all and would be known to be acceptable to all if they were to look for said 
justification. If the premises of the full justification were not acceptable to all, then at least 
some people would reject that conception of justice once they started reflecting 
philosophically on the problem of justice. 
Restrictions on Conceptions of the Good 
Rawls claims that invoking the fact of reasonable pluralism rather than mere pluralism does 
not make a difference as to the content of the principles chosen, but does affect the account of 
stability In order for this latter claim to hold, it must be the case that the designation of a 
doctrine as reasonable or unreasonable is made ex post. In addition, in order to get anything 
like the Difference Principle off the ground, Rawls needs to posit that the parties’ utility 
function with respect to wealth and income is increasing over at least a certain range. In 
particular it must rise sharply up to the guaranteeable level of income and taper off after that 
(Rawls 2001, p98). If the utility function on the other hand was flat or undefined, there would 
be no good reason for the parties to choose one distribution of wealth over another. If it was 
decreasing, parties would prefer less wealth to more. Unless we can rule out some significant 
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subset of conceptions of the good which value wealth negatively, there is no good reason to 
think that people’s fundamental interests are well served by more wealth. Moreover, we 
cannot use the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable doctrines as the 
determination of whether a doctrine is unreasonable is only made after the principles have 
been derived in order to designate those comprehensive doctrines which have political values 
that conflict too much with the chosen principles. 
This problem is not entirely intractable. There may very well be some grounds for placing 
restrictions on conceptions of the good. Since the crucial question is whether any coherent 
conception of the good can ground valid claims and thus if successful, stable social rules or 
principles, one obvious pre-condition for a conception of the good to ground stable social 
rules is that it must be possible for it to do so. A conception of the good can possibly ground 
social rules only if a society can be stably ordered by that conception when everybody 
accepts that conception and complies with the social rules generated from that conception. 
Thus, since if everyone regarded even the minimum amount of wealth required to survive and 
participate in society as bad and acted on rules that reflected such valuation, they would 
starve to death and thus, not be able to participate in society. Hence, such a society would not 
be possible, or for that matter, stable. Therefore, such a conception of the good could not 
possibly ground a moral rule. Similarly, a conception of the good in which the utility function 
for the wealth required to survive and participate in society is flat throughout is indifferent to 
rules which, if implemented, could not stably order any society. Concern for stability thus 
requires us to both establish and limit the scope of the no restrictive assumptions constraint. 
Hereafter, the requirement that no restrictive assumptions are to be made about conceptions 
of the good is to be understood as holding in a qualified sense. No restrictive assumptions are 
to be made on conceptions of the good except that those conceptions can possibly stably 
order some society. 
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Since the content of the principles chosen depends heavily on the account of the HOI, the 
constraints that no restrictions be placed on conceptions of the good and that only publicly 
available general social facts and theories may be employed do a lot of the heavy lifting in 
terms of the content of the principles of justice. These constraints effectively ensure that the 
conception of justice as a whole remains non-perfectionist.  Hence, if these crucial premises 
rely on an account of stability that is unrealistic, much of Rawls’s project would become 
untenable. 
Stability 
There are many things that may be said about Rawls’s account of stability that I outlined in 
the first chapter. However, I lack the space to do full justice to this account. I have perhaps 
exaggerated the extent to which Rawls’s account is a shared reasons account. Rawls 5does 
allow that people may permissibly allow non-public reasons in their private deliberations 
about policy. And Rawls does require that people’s full understanding of the truth fall in line 
with the conclusion reached by the shared reasons. However, for illustrative purposes, I will 
risk caricaturing Rawls’s views here and focus on the shared reasons aspect of his account. 
My aim here is not to undermine Rawls’s view, but to show that we need not rely on any one 
account of stability and that any account of stability for the right reasons requires certain 
constraints. 
Gerald Gaus criticises Rawls’s account on a number of fronts (Gaus 2011, pp38-42). Gaus 
argues that it is unrealistic to expect that the political values that are part of everyone’s 
comprehensive doctrine will turn out to be so similar given what Rawls calls the burdens of 
judgment. Also, Gaus argues that the shared reasons that people have are too thin a basis to 
expect cooperation. He worries that unless the shared values are very robust, people are going 
to be unwilling to bracket away the reasons that they do not share with everyone. Gaus 
proposes an alternative convergence account of stability where everyone finds the social rules 
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acceptable even if they do not consider those rules to be the best from within their own 
comprehensive doctrine. He supposes that the question of which social rules are appropriate 
is like a coordination game with each set of rules being one point of coordination. He 
represents different people having different comprehensive doctrines as them having different 
payoffs for the same coordination point. The same set of social rules may accord with 
different comprehensive doctrines to different extents. So long as the social rules are within 
the acceptable range, Gaus supposes that when people are at one coordination point, no 
person has any incentive to unilaterally move away from that point even when that person 
could do better if everyone was at another coordination point. Of course, in order for this 
account of stability to work, people must as in Rawls’s account, be willing to live with social 
rules that are less than perfect according to their own lights. Similarly as with the shared 
reasons account, no conception of the good can be ruled out in advance or else we would not 
be adequately accounting for the acceptability of a system of rules in light of the full set of 
reasons a person has. Consequently the only social facts and theories used would be those 
that are publicly available. 
As with Rawls’s account, I have not done adequate justice to Gaus’s account to be able to 
make a determination as to which account is superior. It is unclear for example if merely 
reducing the strains of commitment is sufficient to engender stability. Would otherwise 
acceptable rules be rejected if they were promulgated by appealing to some unshared 
reasons? Thankfully, I do not need to adjudicate between the accounts. Any account of 
stability which attempted to posit more points of agreement than Rawls’s account would run 
afoul of the fact of reasonable pluralism. There is already full agreement on the principles of 
justice, the political values that underlie those principles and the general social facts and 
theories. Any further agreement would have to involve agreement about various aspects of 
conceptions of the good. However this is precluded by the fact of reasonable pluralism. By 
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contrast, if there were any fewer points of agreement in an account than in Gaus’s it would be 
difficult to see how any social coordination would even be possible in the first place. 
Consider that if people did not agree to abide by those rules either they end up not 
coordinating at all or they are coerced into coordinating. The former precludes any kind of 
stability at all while the latter may be thought of as stability for the wrong reasons. One 
reason for thinking this is that if the only thing maintaining a particular social ordering is the 
systematic coercion of a group of people, when the coercive apparatus fails or proves 
inadequate, as it is bound to from time to time, those who are so coerced have no reason to 
maintain the social order as the strains of commitment would be too high for them. On the 
other hand, a sufficiently acceptable social order can survive the kinds of temporary shocks 
and disturbances that tend to afflict societies every now and then.  
Similarly, there must be some body of social facts and theories that is suitably publicly 
available to everyone. If there were no set of such facts then social rules that are contrary to 
one’s own comprehensive conception of the good would always invoke such restrictions on 
one’s own conception of the good as to deny it ever having justificatory weight. Consider 
how this is done with social rules that express one religious conception of the good like 
Christianity. When the social facts and theories affirmed by such a conception of justice 
include those only affirmed by Christians, it simultaneously denies any similar factual or 
theoretical claim made by non-Christians. If Christianity is true, then religious claims made 
by Hindus (to take an example) would be meaningless. Non-Christian modes of worship 
would not provide the salvation those respective religions claim they will bring. Thus non-
Christian religious claims would be meaningless and thus be invalid. Other claims that did 
not touch upon religious doctrines would fare differently. Thus, to include any non-public 
factual or theoretical claim is to make the resulting rule set unacceptable to those who do not 
subscribe to such claims. If no factual or theoretical claim is publicly available, then there is 
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no conception of justice which would be acceptable to all reasonable persons. That is to say 
even though in Gaus’s model the conception of justice that is accepted should in principle be 
acceptable even to people who have a non-public set of social facts and theories, if we are to 
model the reasoning that would justify the conception that is acceptable to everyone, 
including non-public social facts and theories would preclude the acceptance of a great many 
people who hold contrary views. 
It seems then that Gaus’s and Rawls’s accounts of stability form two extremes of a range of 
possible accounts of stability in a pluralistic society. Given that both accounts require that no 
restrictive assumptions be made about conceptions of the good and that the body of social 
facts and theories be publicly available any intermediate account of stability would require 
such as well. Thus both are necessary conditions for any reasonable account of stability. If 
that is the case, then the particular details of any account of stability are not necessary. So 
long as there is at least one empirically plausible account of stability, both conditions 
constrain what principles may stably order a pluralistic society. 
People’s Highest Order Interests 
In order to maintain his non-perfectionist stance Rawls claims that all aspects of a person’s 
highest order interests are either constitutive or instrumental of a person’s final ends whatever 
those ends may be. However, it is not clear that all four highest order interests are necessarily 
instrumental towards a person’s final ends. One can see how pursuing a definite conception 
of the good would lead to gaining the benefits of social cooperation. Those benefits just are a 
person’s final ends. However, the capacity for a conception of the good has two aspects to it. 
Insofar as the capacity for a conception of the good involves the capacity to formulate more 
efficient means to those final ends, exercising and developing those capacities are necessary 
to gaining the benefits of social cooperation. However, this capacity also involves the 
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capacity to revise and assess those ends. But revising one’s final ends has nothing to do with 
and may in fact hinder the achievement of those ends. In addition, communitarians deny that 
people have the capacity to freely revise their final ends (Freeman 2010, p294; Sandel 1982, 
pp54-59). Given a thin conception of rationality as taking the most efficient means to one’s 
ends, there is no need, unless it is part of one’s own final ends, to exercise or develop the 
capacity to revise one’s conception of the good in order to engage in or enjoy the benefits of 
social cooperation.  
Neither the exercise nor the development of the capacity for a sense of justice is always 
conducive to the achievement of one’s final ends. Considered purely from the perspective of 
a person’s rational interest and according to many individualist accounts of the good, there 
must be at least some occasions when cooperating requires subordinating one’s own interest 
to others’. Thus at least some instances of cooperating would not be conducive to gaining the 
benefits of social cooperation. Since developing this moral capacity just increases a person’s 
readiness to subordinate his own interests if or when required to do so, it sometimes hinders 
the enjoyment of the benefits of social cooperation. Thus, the exercise and development of 
this latter moral power cannot be justified with respect enjoyment of the benefits of social 
cooperation.  
However, the exercise and development of the capacity for a sense of justice is clearly 
necessary for social cooperation. Stable social cooperation cannot be obtained without a 
sense of justice. And this sense must be developed if the members of society are to have an 
adequate moral understanding and motivation. However, if we are to locate people’s highest 
order interests purely in an account of the rational and adhere to a thin account of rationality, 
engaging in social cooperation does not necessarily lead to gaining its benefits. In fact, 
according to a number of conceptions of the good, the best for a person is for everyone else to 
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have a sense of justice and engage in social cooperation while ignoring those rules in one’s 
own case. 
This problem can be solved if this aspect of a person’s highest order interests was part of the 
reasonable. Being reasonable necessarily requires the exercise and development of the 
capacity for a sense of justice. And at least part of being reasonable involves engaging in 
social cooperation (or coordination) even to the extent of subordinating some of one’s own 
interests. The worry, here, could be that this implies that part of what is in someone’s highest 
order interest is being reasonable. It is, however, at the very least counterintuitive or possibly 
even incoherent to talk about a person’s interests as necessarily involving aspects of the 
reasonable without abandoning non-perfectionism. Rawls addresses this problem by noting 
that the members of a well ordered society are already committed to being reasonable. If one 
is already committed to being reasonable, then necessarily, one is rationally required to 
develop one’s sense of justice.  
One can thus, with suitable modifications, take a person’s highest order interests to be what 
grounds valid claims.  To clarify, a person is more likely to accept a conception which allows 
him to achieve his final ends than one which does not. In a pluralistic society, a conception of 
justice which, with the above discussed exceptions, does not restrict what conceptions of the 
good can justify valid claims is most likely to be acceptable to everyone. Exercising and 
developing the capacity to achieve one’s final ends is necessarily instrumental to achieving 
them. If claims pertaining to the latter are valid, so are claims pertaining to the former. The 
discussed exceptions cover cases where some people’s final ends cannot ground valid claims 
because the achievement of such ends pertains in certain specified ways to making social 
coordination impossible. In addition stable coordination in a pluralistic society according to 
rules everyone can accept requires people to know when to stop pushing claims to the point 
where others find it unacceptable. That is to say, in order for social coordination according to 
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norms acceptable to everyone to be possible, the capacity to know when claims which if were 
advanced would make such coordination impossible ought not to be advanced is necessary. 
This capacity can be termed the capacity for a sense of justice and claims pertaining to the 
development and exercise of this capacity have to likewise override claims pertaining to 
one’s final ends. This classification exhausts the logical space of what sorts of claims could 
count as valid given that we want a conception of justice that is acceptable to all in a 
pluralistic society. It follows trivially from this that the preference ordering each party gives 
the conceptions of justice is a function of the above considerations. For terminological 
convenience, since its content resembles Rawls’s account of the highest order interests in 
most respects and because it occupies the same structural role as the HOI in the OP, I will 
term the pursuit of one’s conception of the good and the exercise and development of one’s 
two moral capacities a person’s highest order interests. More precisely, the account of what 
grounds a valid claim by a person is termed that person’s HOI whatever that account may be. 
Thus any coherent conception of justice has a corresponding account of a person’s HOI. In 
the case where we are concerned with the stability of a conception of justice in a pluralistic 
society, content of the HOI is filled out as the pursuit of a person’s conception of the good 
and the exercise and development of the two moral powers. 
I have, so far, shown that a number of the initial considerations like the idea of society as a 
system of cooperation, generality, publicity and the account of people’s highest order 
interests are too thick. In fact, the generality condition is not necessary and any argument for 
the Veil of Ignorance from that premise has not been shown by Rawls to be successful. I have 
improved on the account of stability, not by proposing my own, but by comparing two very 
different ones and showing how any account of stability is going to require two constraints: 
The second level of stability and the no restrictive assumptions constraint. Unfortunately, I 
have not been able to do the empirical work to show that some account of stability for the 
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right reasons will fall within a certain range and be realistically workable and successful. I 
have yet to show that the OP can be derived deductively from these far thinner premises. I 




Chapter 4: Reconstructing the Original Position 
In this chapter, I will argue for the use of a choice situation, a thick Veil of Ignorance, and a 
conception of the parties as rational and mutually disinterested. There are seven parts to the 
argument in this chapter. First I argue that there is some choice situation in which the correct 
principles of justice would be chosen. Secondly, I argue that the choice situation requires a 
Veil of Ignorance that hides the identities and personal particulars of those represented by the 
parties. Thirdly I argue that the Veil of Ignorance should also hide the relative proportions of 
the characteristics that people possess. Next, I argue that the Veil of Ignorance should hide 
the historical circumstances of the society and which generation the people parties represent 
are currently in at the moment. I have already established that of the general social facts and 
theories only the publicly available ones are not hidden by the Veil. I will next argue that the 
parties are to be rational and mutually disinterested. I have already argued that a general 
characterisation of the basis for valid claims is the pursuit of one’s conception of the good 
and the exercise and development of the two moral powers sans the capacity to revise one’s 
final ends. I will now briefly outline the argument I will be making in favour of the OP. 
The argument, roughly, will show that a choice situation in which the parties will necessarily 
choose the principles of justice is reducible to the OP or something very close to it. The 
argument for most aspects of the Veil of Ignorance, very roughly, is that if it can be shown 
antecedently that the principles of justice are invariant with respect to certain facts, said facts 
can be eliminated from the description of the choice situation without affecting the outcome 
of the choice procedure. The argument for the description of the parties depends on the full 
set of moral reasons being distributable among persons in some way whatever that may turn 
out to be. I will show that this is indeed the case. 
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I have already, in the previous chapter, argued that the account of highest order interests 
Rawls provides needs to be modified to account for the possibility that some reasonable 
doctrines may not necessarily require concern for the capacity to revise one’s conception of 
the good. 
Coordination and Justice 
It can be seen that for even one instance of conflict, there is more than one way to resolve that 
conflict. One rule might tell one party to withhold its claim and the other party that it can 
advance its claim as far as it can, or vice versa, or another may allow each party to only 
advance their claims partially in such a way that no conflict arises in situations where this is 
possible. Given that there are many possible social rules that could govern a situation, the 
question that arises is: which rule should be adopted?  
Analytically, it can be shown that any set of complex claim counter-claim pairs can in which 
each side is only partially successful can in principle be broken down into simpler pairs of 
claims and counter claims each of which have no partial resolution. The idea is that in any 
situation where it is possible for a claim to be partially successful, the person advancing that 
claim could have instead advanced a different claim which only extended as far as the first 
claim was partially successful. This latter claim if it had been advanced in the first place 
would, everything else being equal, been fully successful. For example, consider two people 
making conflicting claims over $1000. One person is rather poor and needs the money while 
the other person earned that money as part of his salary. In principle either the first person 
could get all the $1000, the second person could keep all of it or the poor person could get 
some fraction of it. It is possible to break down this single set of claims into multiple 
successive sets of claims each at the smallest unit of currency. The advantage of breaking 
claims like this down is that regardless of what the proper way to resolve the macro conflict 
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is, each micro claim is either completely successful or not. Suppose that the correct way to 
resolve the claim of the $1000 was for one person to keep $400 and the other to receive $600. 
It would be difficult to characterise the strength of the reasons behind the claims and counter 
claims. For example, would we say that the welfare recipient’s claims are stronger? If they 
are, why should he not receive the full $1000? By contrast, when broken down, one way to 
account for the result would be that the claims for the marginal dollar put forward by the 
welfare recipient were stronger up to the 600th dollar, but the tax payer’s claim was stronger 
after that point. 
As stipulated earlier, the central problem of justice concerns which set of rules is morally 
appropriate to resolve conflicting claims. Consequently, and appropriately so, those situations 
where there are conflicting claims to be resolved by some rule or another are regarded by 
Rawls as circumstances of justice. The first step in solving the problem of justice is noting 
that any conception of justice specifies some basis upon which valid claims may be 
advanced. For example, a utilitarian theory designates pleasure as that basis. A person may 
push a claim on behalf of his own pleasure. A utilitarian theory will find such a claim 
weighty and its rules will be designed to favour stronger claims, those engendering a higher 
net pleasure, over weaker, those engendering a lower net pleasure, claims. The pleasure that a 
person would receive when abiding by a set of rules thus stands as a defeasible reason for that 
set of rules. This can be generalised beyond utilitarianism. Since a just basic structure is one 
in which the rules favour stronger claims over weaker, the bases for those valid claims stand 
as defeasible reasons in favour of that set of rules. I have already established in the previous 
chapter that the pursuit of one’s highest order interests (HOI) are what ground valid claims 
people can make against one another. 
Any coherent conception of justice would have a corresponding conception of what people’s 
HOI are. If it did not, it would not be able to claim that it has ordered claims in a morally 
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non-arbitrary manner. The basic idea is that any conception of justice has some criteria about 
their social rules. Any system of rules places requirements on how a person is to treat others 
(and oneself), and when he does so, how he is to be treated as well. To be clear, social rules 
do not just direct people to treat others in particular ways, they can give people latitude to 
treat others in a range of ways. Similarly there need not just be one expectation about how 
one will be treated by others, but a range of such expectations. What this means is that a full 
aggregation of the description of how each person is to treat everyone else and how each 
person is to be treated will merely be a reformulation of the criteria.  Because of this, we can 
disaggregate the criteria and assign these criteria in some way to each person. For example, if 
aggregate utility is the criterion of justice, then this can be disaggregated into each person’s 
utility. More generally, the criteria of justice, when disaggregated, are each person’s HOI.  
One potential objection is that such talk of HOI biases the whole project in favour of 
individualist teleological theories. A simple utilitarian theory would specify that the benefit is 
pleasure, and the best system of rules is one that we can expect to maximise aggregate 
pleasure. A person has a prima facie valid claim against the system of rules that said system 
be such as to provide for his pleasure. However, could deontological or even non-
individualistic teleological theories of justice be so characterised? 
To analyse a non-individualistic teleological theory, I draw upon Fred Miller’s account of 
extreme holism as I detailed in the previous chapter. On an extreme holist view like Plato’s 
even if the guardians (social class consisting of aristocrats, law-keepers and soldiers) would 
prefer disposable wealth, it is in their HOI to not have disposable wealth as having such 
would distract them and make them into something other than guardians and this would end 
up corrupting the city (Jowett 1871, IV). Thus, under a platonic conception of justice, claims 
made by guardians for disposable wealth would not carry moral weight. On the other hand, 
70 
 
claims made by guardians against artisans engaging in what Plato considered unjust activity 
would carry weight. 
A similar move may also be made with regards to deontological theories. Take, for example, 
a standard deontological theory like Nozick’s (Nozick 1974). According to Nozick, 
respecting people’s natural rights is just what it means to treat them as ends and not merely as 
means (Nozick 1974, pp30-31). Each person is justly treated if his rights are respected and he 
treats others justly when he respects their rights. Each person therefore has a prima facie 
claim that the system of rules respects his rights. Or alternatively, under a non-rights-based 
deontological theory, it may be that some duties are the fundamental moral requirements. The 
conception of justice in that case could require that social institutions require, facilitate or 
merely permit the performance of that duty. A society would therefore be prima facie just to 
the extent it requires/facilitates/permits the performance of our duties. This too can be 
distributed among people. Each person would have various duties he owed to himself and 
other members of society.  It is easy to conceive of societies where people owe duties to their 
family, to their clans, their feudal lord, their king or even to God. Such duties may themselves 
ground social rules. At this stage, I do not consider what actually would ground a just basic 
structure.  All I have shown is that whatever grounds a just basic structure, valid claims will 
be based on them and it can be associated with people in such a way that it is sensible to talk 
about whether a person in a particular society successfully pursues his HOI or otherwise.  
Just because all morally relevant criteria fall under the rubric of HOI, it does not follow that 
the just-ness of the system is a simple agglomeration of the extent to which people are able to 
achieve their HOI. For example, from the mere fact that having one’s natural rights respected 
is in one’s HOI it does not follow that merely minimising rights violations is appropriate. 
Whether respecting rights is appropriately treated as a goal or a side constraint is not 
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something that is to be decided at this stage of the argument. Therefore, the most that can be 
inferred is the following principle: 
Insofar that a system of social rules furthers the HOI of some member of 
society, there is a prima facie and possibly defeasible moral reason in favour 
of that system.  
This is a weak claim. It may be that this reason can be overridden, or undercut in such a way 
as to nullify its status as a reason. This also means that insofar as system A is pareto-superior 
to system B in terms of the extent to which people can successfully pursue their HOI, A is 
more just than B. As mentioned earlier, nothing I have said so far, however, gives us any way 
to aggregate, balance claims, or determine whether one claim over-rides another or undercuts 
it. Theories of justice differ from each other because they have different notions of what 
counts as a benefit and they differ on how the various prima facie moral reasons interact with 
one another. I also leave open whether reasons can be undercut or overridden.  
Initial Choice Situations 
It is analytic that: 
Insofar as an object O contains some feature F1 which a person P prefers, 
ceteris paribus, that provides P with prima facie but potentially defeasible 
reason to prefer O.  
From this it follows that for any set of O-like objects that contain F-like features, the object 
that is ultimately chosen by some ideally rational person P is the object in which the balance 
of features F5 are optimum in that set. For example when choosing chairs, there are many 
features of chairs such as their sturdiness, shape, comfort, price and appearance which a 
                                                     
5
 To clarify, F denotes the set of all the features that P prefers. 
72 
 
person may prefer. If a person does not care at all about the appearance of a chair, then he has 
no reason, everything else being equal, to prefer a more aesthetically pleasing chair to one 
that is less so. This does not preclude the possibility that assuming the above listed properties 
are desirable, shape, comfort, appearance and price may be undercut as reasons if the chair is 
so flimsy as to collapse when briefly sat upon. Thus putative reasons could possibly be 
defeated in such a way that they were not any reason at all. It is also possible that in a 
conflict, some reasons may simply be overridden without thereby undermining their status as 
reasons. For example, given that a person does care about comfort and price, the fact that she 
would choose the cheaper but slightly less comfortable chair does not mean that comfort is 
not a relevant factor. Thus, given a suitable specification of a person’s preferences vis a vis 
the various features of the chair, it is a simple application of rational choice theory to figure 
out which chair she ought to choose. While basic structures are not chairs, there should not be 
any reason why a suitably designed choice situation would not yield some sort of ranking of 
the various basic structures. 
Presumably, if F was designated to be the a person’s HOI and O to be a system of rules, then 
a rational person who prefers the achievement of his HOI ceteris paribus prefers systems of 
rules for which there are prima facie moral reasons in favour of. If an initial choice situation 
where the parties who were doing the choosing are P-like was then to be set up, the system of 
rules that will be choose if they were rational would be the system that would be supported 
by the preponderance of moral reasons. This is not to say that any such device will do, only 
that there is some kind of initial choice situation such that the output of the choice situation is 
the most just (most morally justified) system of rules 
At this point, it seems as if the choice situation, if set up correctly would deliver the correct 
kinds of inferences that can be made from the premises of a moral theory. But this 
transformation seems to be a terribly complicated step. One could ask why anyone would go 
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through the bother of complicating theories of social morality in this way. The key benefit of 
transforming a theory of social morality into a contract device is that this allows us to use the 
robust analytic framework of rational choice theory to make correct inferences. We ordinarily 
have trouble figuring out how reasons interact with one another. We often let our intuitions 
dominate our inferences. However, the analytic framework for rational choice theory is 
sufficiently robust that it can show us how to make a valid inference given a collection of 
prima facie reasons.  
Suppose that each party was only aware of what his or her own HOI was. In such a case, they 
may advance competing claims against one another. If it is the case that some conception or 
set of conceptions of justice are better supported by moral reasons, that conception would be 
the correct one. What would it take for the conception of justice that the parties in the above 
situation came to agree on be the correct one?  
It follows from the account of people’s HOI that the correct conception of justice is the set of 
rules and principles which best responds to the claims made on the basis of the successful 
pursuit of those HOI. This stands to reason as HOI just are those things that are morally 
appropriate for people to achieve so long as they abide by a just set of rules. Thus, the fact 
that a person achieves to a greater extent her HOI under one set of rules is a prima facie and 
potentially defeasible, moral reason in favour of that set. If all the parties were fully and 
properly responsive to these reasons, then when they encountered others whose claims 
conflicted with their own, they would mutually adjust those claims until they agreed. When 
everyone has presented their claim against everyone else, everyone is fully aware of all the 
relevant reasons and is fully responsive to those reasons as well, whatever they turn out to be. 
As it turns out this is already a choice situation in which all the choosing parties are 
homogeneous. However, since we do not know what the proper response to reasons is, we 
cannot directly infer what such parties would choose. If this choice situation can be 
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appropriately simplified into the OP, then the OP is justified. My task, here, is to show that 
this simplification is appropriate and does not distort the way in which the considerations are 
supposed to justify the principles.  
The Veil of Ignorance 
The Veil of Ignorance consists of multiple parts, and it may not necessarily be the case that 
one single set of reasons can account for all the parts. The central part of the Veil of 
Ignorance is the fact that people’s personal identities are kept hidden from the parties. The 
Veil of Ignorance hides, among other things: people’s talents, preferences, proclivities, 
dispositions, race, gender, wealth, religious beliefs and other personal attributes.  
The basic reasoning behind the Veil of Ignorance is that since if everyone was perfectly 
responsive to all moral reasons they would converge to the same conception of justice, their 
choice of principles does not depend on their personal identity. Thus a choice situation where 
everyone was fully aware of all information and perfectly responsive to reasons can be 
simplified to one in which people are not aware of their personal identity and personal 
particulars. 
I will illustrate this by using the example of a non-general conception of justice: First Person 
Dictatorship (FPD)6. FPD refers to a conception where a specific person’s conception of 
justice is the only basis of all valid claims. For example, suppose that the following 
conception of justice is correct: 
                                                     
6
 I choose intuitively implausible examples for a number of reasons. Firstly, because it would be it would seem 
to beg the question about the Veil of Ignorance if I used general conceptions in my example. General principles 
have an intuitive connection to generality. The aim is to prove a formal point and the substantive intuitive 
plausibility of the example would seem to mask the force of the formal point. In addition, if the formal point is 
successful even given the least favourable of examples, then the analyticity of the claim becomes more obvious 
as it becomes easier to see how no counter examples are possible. Secondly, given that I have argued against the 
generality constraint, it would not be appropriate if I seemed to smuggle the condition back in by gaming all the 
examples to meet the generality requirement. 
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FPDC: Any, all and only claims that improve the personal well-being of 
Charles are valid. A claim is stronger to the degree it contributes to Charles’s 
well-being. 
To clarify, I refer only to versions of the principle which at the fundamental level use a 
proper name or a rigged description. For example, this excludes theories where FPDC is the 
case because Charles is the Prince of Wales, or because Charles cares very deeply for human 
rights and global warming. Those may turn out to be the case, but they are not what would 
make FPDC correct. Thus, each person’s HOI is Charles’s well-being. Claims can plausibly 
conflict even when everyone makes claims based on Charles’s well-being if there are 
conflicts between the different ways to improve said well-being. If each person is initially 
concerned with her own HOI that means that each person is aware only of the way her 
actions can improve Charles’s well-being. When they meet one another, they become aware 
of other conflicting ways in which Charles’s well-being may be improved. In becoming 
aware of the other ways in which Charles’s well-being may be improved, the parties will 
adjust their claims where necessary since they care only about Charles’s well-being. Suppose 
there was a fact of the matter about how to resolve trade-offs among the various features of 
Charles’s well-being. Being properly responsive to Charles’s well-being requires being aware 
of such a fact. If there was such a fact and the parties were not aware of it, they would choose 
a set of rules that was sub-optimal in terms of the contribution to Charles’s well being. Since 
if FPDC were correct, Charles’s well-being was the only morally relevant claim, if they were 
not aware of the fact, the conception of justice chosen would not be the correct one. If there 
was no such fact of that matter, then this indeterminacy would also carry over into their 
considerations. Once they have understood all the reasons for and against various sets of 
rules, they would acknowledge those different rule sets as promoting Charles’s well-being 
and also acknowledge that they could not tell which did a better job of doing so. Thus even in 
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the case where a person’s personal identity is morally relevant, the parties in the choice 
situation even under full information would choose the same principles of justice regardless 
of the identity, gender, race, preferences, beliefs and conception of the good of the persons 
they represent. 
One objection to the above is that the various parties would not agree because they start with 
different beliefs. Gerald Gaus argues that everything else being equal, a person requires less 
reason to not drop a belief that he already holds than to take up a belief that he does not (Gaus 
2010, p240). That is, even ideal reasoners will be epistemically conservative to at least some 
extent. Their final beliefs will be some function of their initial beliefs. Applied to the initial 
situation in this way, as the parties come to learn about how there are other ways to improve 
Charles’s well-being they will be rightfully resistant to revising what rules one recommends. 
This means that if Gaus is correct, the parties will not, even under full knowledge, agree on a 
conception of justice. This is a conservative account of reasoning. However, my objection to 
weak epistemic conservatism should apply here as well. Conservative reasoners would 
(absurdly) have to claim to be epistemically justified in believing two contradictory 
propositions. Thus in at least the case of FPDC, the personal identity and particulars of the 
people the parties represent are invariant with respect to what principles they would choose. 
Under a different criterion of validity, the principles chosen may change, but the invariance 
with respect to the personal identity and particulars of the parties represent should remain the 
same.  
The choice situation, on reflection, is a process by which putatively valid reasons are 
transformed into principles and rules. Thus, those reasons can be treated as independent 
variables and the set of principles as the dependent variable or the value of the relation. The 
choice situation is itself this relation. 
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If a relation is invariant across its range with respect to a particular set of putative variables, 
then said set does not contain any non-trivial variable that figures into the relation. Put more 
formally,  
, , , … 	,  = ,  iff f is invariant over all 	∀	 ∈ 	 	1, 
 
 Similarly, if there is some representational device that aggregates all the relevant moral 
reasons, but remains invariant with respect to the personal identity as well as other features of 
the situation, then personal identity is not one of the considerations or variables of the device. 
The device can therefore be simplified without affecting the outcome by eliminating the 
parties’ knowledge of the personal identity, or the particular features possess by the people 
they represent. This can be presumed to be the case since even when aware of their personal 
identity and particular features about themselves, their choice of social rules and principles 
does not change.  
We cannot figure out what counts by counting it 
Obscuring personal identity and individuating features does not yet cover all aspects of the 
Veil of Ignorance. In the Veil of Ignorance specific features of society like what percentage 
of people belong to a particular ethnic group are also hidden. It is tempting to think that such 
a provision is unjustified as it seemingly hides relevant information. One may want to argue 
that if a rule is prima facie just to the extent that under it a person is able to successfully 
pursue her HOI, then knowing the exact composition of society would allow us to craft social 
rules that enable the most people to achieve to the largest extent their HOI. But this presumes 
that something which is a HOI in the context of some claim-counterclaim pairs is a HOI for 
any claim-counterclaim pair which invokes that thing as a basis for the claim.  
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To recall, the conditions of justice obtain when people make claims against each other that 
cannot simultaneously be satisfied. Social rules resolve this coordination problem by telling 
us which claim takes precedence and how much each claim needs to be moderated if at all. A 
social rule tells a person to withdraw a claim or to refrain from making a claim on others by 
either indicating that that claim is invalid when faced with a counterclaim, or by showing that 
even if valid, it is weaker. I will call the former kind of rule validating rules and the latter 
balancing rules. Since social rules require a certain level of generality in order to be 
effectively publicised, they do not invalidate claims on an individual basis, but certain classes 
of claims. When a certain class of claim is valid, people have pro-tanto reasons to satisfy said 
claim. However, if a claim is not valid, there is no such pro-tanto reason.  
To illustrate, I will contrast two ways of thinking about how to think about a rapist’s pleasure. 
On one view, which I will call the intuitive view, the pleasure a paedophile feels when he 
rapes a child is not to be balanced against the pain the child will feel. The enjoyment of the 
immoral act may even compound its wrongness. A contrasting view which I shall call the 
utilitarian view supposes that even though rape is ultimately unjustified, the pleasure the 
rapist feels is a pro tanto reason in favour of the rape. It just turns out that the long term pain 
felt by the victim always or almost always outweighs the pleasure felt by the rapist. Under the 
intuitive view, the rapist’s claim is not valid while under the utilitarian view, the rapist’s 
claim while valid is still defeated. Under the intuitive view, the rapist’s claim will never be 
successful under any circumstances. Under the utilitarian view, it is possible that the ratio of 
rapists to victims may be sufficiently large so that the total pleasure of the rapists outweighs 
the pain of the victim. 
The way in which the ratio of claimants to counterclaimants affects the rules can perhaps be 
better seen when it comes to taxation to provide welfare. Suppose, for the sake of argument, 
that it is the case that both claims by needy for welfare funded by taxation and claims by 
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taxpayers to keep their marginal dollar are both valid. Which claim succeeds may depend on 
the how many people are on each side of the conflict. There are many possibilities. It could 
be that if there are many tax payers, the marginal dollar extracted from each of them has 
potential to benefit welfare recipients greatly. It is possible to see how this could in some 
circumstances over-ride the claims of the tax payers on that dollar. At the same time, 
everything else being equal, if there are too many recipients, their benefit on receiving end 
may be negligible. In such a circumstance, the claim of the tax payers would be successful. 
By contrast, a libertarian view like Nozick’s may treat any such welfare claim as invalid and 
would always allow the taxpayer’s claim to trump the putative welfare recipient’s claim 
regardless of the relative proportions of tax payers and welfare recipients.  The above 
contrasts illustrate the notion of validity and two types of rules. One type of rule that settles 
conflicting claims balances the strengths of the claims against each other. The other type of 
rule specifies which of the conflicting claims are valid. In order for a balancing rule to apply, 
it must antecedently be the case that both the claims and the counterclaims are valid. If one of 
them was not, then by definition, it would carry no weight. 
I should also note that validity need not be absolute. People in liberal societies ordinarily 
think that a claim to pursue one’s own religious obligations may be valid when the opposing 
claim is a claim to direct the religious activity of others in order to save their souls. However, 
suppose it is the case as commonly believed in liberal societies, that religious liberty does not 
extend so far as to permit human sacrifice. A claim to religious liberty would, if this were the 
case, be trumped by a claim to protect one’s own life. To say that a particular claim is valid 
when put against some kinds of claims is not necessarily to say that it will be valid when 
faced with other kinds of claims, although there is nothing that rules it out. 
Since balancing rules presuppose that claims under consideration are already valid, balancing 
rules work within a framework of validating rules. Therefore in order for balancing rules to 
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be just, the validating rules that underlie these balancing rules must themselves be just. Can 
this serve as a framework with which we can view all theories of social morality or justice? 
Let us survey a few examples to see if there are possible exceptions. I will briefly examine 
classical utilitarianism, preference satisfactionist consequentialism and Nozickean self-
ownership theory. Classical utilitarianism, rather surprisingly, does have a validity rule: Only 
pleasure and pain claims are valid. Preference satisfaction utilitarianism might seem to be a 
theory which does not have any validity rule. However, we might plausibly posit that it has a 
rather trivial one: All claims based on the satisfaction of preferences are valid. A harder case 
is Nozickean self-ownership theory (NSOT). That seems to be a theory that consists only of 
validity rules: Any claim against someone’s natural rights is not valid. The problem is that 
under NSOT, validity rules cover such a large range of cases that there seems to be little or 
even no room for balancing rules. However, while NSOT may plausibly be described as not 
having any balancing rules that govern interactions between humans, the same cannot be said 
for interactions between humans and animals. Nozick supposes that animals can make valid 
claims on us and that these have to be balanced against the claims we, humans make on 
animals. (Nozick 1974, pp35-41) Moreover, one plausible way of interpreting Nozick is to 
see NSOT as concerned only with some of the social rules. NSOT, under this interpretation, 
is a theory that only deals with validating rules as they regard coercive institutions like the 
state. Other kinds of moral obligations that people have towards each other may plausibly be 
described by balancing rules, but those do not concern coercive institutions. It seems, then, 
that any system of social rules can be seen as conforming to this structure. Even if we were to 
think of a system which does not contain balancing rules at all, we could still force such a 




Therefore, all systems of social rules contain a non-empty set of validating rules and a 
possibly empty set of balancing rules. Furthermore, the justice of those balancing rules 
presupposes that the validating rules which validate the competing claims are just. Moreover, 
whereas the question of which balancing rules are just is plausibly dependent on the specific 
demographics of a society, the question of which validating rules are just are insensitive to 
demographics. At this point, one might object that while all the moral views I have surveyed 
have validity rules that are insensitive to demographics, it is not logically impossible for 
validity rules to vary with demographics.  
But there are good reasons to think that this is not the case. I will grant that it seems possible 
for ascriptions of validity to change with demographics. Even if ascriptions of validity change 
with demographics, then while the rule that ascribes validity to claims may be complex and 
explicitly ascribe validity based on demographic criteria, the rule itself is invariant with 
respect to demographic profiles. Consider again the choice situation in which everyone is 
aware of and perfectly responsive to all the moral reasons. The parties would make some 
ascription of validity to particular claims. In the examples I have given above, the kinds of 
claims to which validity is ascribed do not change even when the demographic profile 
changes. However, it is logically possible that the sorts of claims which are ascribed as valid 
could vary with demographic changes. Thus, in an alternative choice situation which is 
identical to the first except that the society thus represented has a different profile, there could 
be a different set of claims which are ascribed valid. Since in both situations, all the parties 
are fully aware of all moral reasons, they would know how to assign validity to claims even 
in counterfactual situations where the demographic profile had been different. If they are 
aware of this, then they can trivially construct a conditional which assigns validity to claims 
depending on a particular demographic profile. Since parties from any society regardless of 
the demographic profile will construct the same conditional, the conditional is itself invariant 
82 
 
with respect to demographic profiles. Since the conditional is a validity rule, albeit a 
complicated one, validity rules are also invariant with respect to demographic profiles.  
The question, then, is how do we account for both validity rules and balancing rules when we 
construct our contract situation? For balancing rules, so long as we build the (known) 
validating rules in as constraints on the choice by the party who is aware of demographic 
information, we can arrive at appropriate balancing rules. On the other hand, can we derive 
non-trivial validating rules from an initial contractual situation?  
Since validity rules are insensitive to population demographics, when looking at the 
validating rule for a particular kind of interaction, we should focus on a single instance of that 
interaction instead of looking at the probability with which we may end up on either side of 
that interaction. However, now, we run into a problem. We cannot, at the same time, block 
out information about the composition of the population in order to derive validating rules 
and allow such information for the purpose of deriving balancing rules. Since the balancing 
rules depend on the validating rules, this requires two iterations of the contract situation. In 
the first, there is a Veil of Ignorance that blocks off demographic information. While in the 
second iteration, such information is revealed, but the previously obtained validating rules are 
further built in as constraints on the choice. 
Recall the choice situation in which the parties are fully aware of all the relevant reasons. 
Then imagine a similar situation except that the proportion of claimants to counterclaimants 
differs. If there are any conflicting valid claims, it is likely that the difference in proportion 
would result in a different set of rules. Yet, per hypothesis, there should be no difference in 
what the validity rules were. For example, if it turned out that Justice as Fairness was the 
correct account of justice, in neither situation would a claim for wealth on the behalf of the 
worst off ever trump the right to personal property. This is because the latter is guaranteed by 
83 
 
the liberty principle which stands in lexical priority to the difference principle (Rawls 2001, 
p114). This does not preclude the existence of ways in which to resolve conflicts among the 
basic liberties. Similarly, simply by denoting a set of basic liberties which are to have lexical 
priority, any claim to liberties from outside the set is not valid when they conflict against 
liberties from within the set. The principles of justice that are chosen in the OP, thus spell out 
validity criteria which subsequent iterations of the choice situation will incorporate in 
selecting more specific rules suited for specific societies. Any such validating rules would 
delimit the bounds of what would otherwise be valid claims. Essentially, such a choice 
situation would be equivalent to a coherency argument; that is, if such a choice situation 
picks out some kinds of claims as invalid relative to others, then it would not have been 
possible to suppose such claims to be valid and at the same time hold to the presuppositions 
of morality that all moral theories need to and acknowledge in order to count as moral 
theories. 
 Ahistorical Historicity 
Demographic information is not the only society specific information that is hidden in the 
Veil of Ignorance. The specific historical conditions of the society are left out as well. This is 
in part justified by the nature of the project; we are looking for principles that are acceptable 
to people in a well ordered society under favourable conditions which, while possible, need 
not be actual. Specific historical accidents as well as current political impasses can 
unfortunately create obstacles for the realisation of justice. Because we are looking for 
principles that transcend historical accidents, we don’t need to include such information lest it 
distract the parties behind the Veil. 
The reason this is not entirely satisfactory is that one could reasonably ask: what if we were 
looking for social rules that were appropriate to a particular, historically situated, society? If 
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we are to answer this question, we need a reason more fundamental to the nature of rules to 
show that whether some social rules are just does not depend on the specific history of a 
society.  
One plausible objection to thinking that historical information is irrelevant to whether a claim 
is valid or not is that the nature of the claim or its strength may depend on past events. In 
particular, I have in mind two kinds of cases. The first is Nozickean historical entitlement 
principles. The second kind of claim would be collective reparation claims made by minority 
groups. I will try to show that in each case, the historical information is unnecessary to justify 
the rule even if such information may be necessary to apply the rule. 
Nozickean historical principles are rules about property in which the issue of whether a 
person has a valid claim on a piece of property depends on whether the property in question 
has been subject to illegitimate transactions.  Was the property properly originally acquired? 
Was it voluntarily transferred in all cases where it was transferred? If not, was the coercive 
transfer rectified appropriately? Unless we know the particular history of transactions, 
abuses, petty and perhaps, not-so-petty coercions we will not know what will be required by 
the application of Nozick’s principles. Therefore, whether and how to apply Nozick’s 
principles may plausibly depend on the history of the society. One important way in which 
historical principles are affected by the particular history of a society is the case of collective 
reparations to minority groups. When collective reparations are owed to historically abused 
minority groups, their payment usually manifests as rules that give certain kinds of 
preferential treatment. Thus, whether to give certain groups what appears to be preferential 
treatment depends on whether they have historically been subject to systematic abuse by 
other groups. . Notice, however, that these historical principles, while relying on historical 
information for correct application, do not depend on particular historical circumstances for 
their validity. Nozick’s principle of rectification purports to be always valid, as do claims 
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about historical injustice. The conditional that if there was some  historical injustice, then 
reparations for said injustice are owed is at least, on the face of it, invariant regardless of 
whether or not there was any such injustice. 
I have so far argued that the most fundamental aspect of justifying historical rules is 
independent of the particular historical context of the society where the rule is to apply. One 
objection to such a line of argument would be that justification is itself path dependent. The 
basic Hayekian idea is that social orders evolve over time in response to specific social 
problems that arise. Successful coordination occurs when people internalise those norms as 
well as the evaluative standards that accompany those norms and furthermore, they see those 
norms as meeting the evaluative standards that they have accepted. Therefore, the appropriate 
evaluative standards for social rules in any society are themselves dependent on the particular 
historical context of that society. It is not clear that this is necessarily the case, but even if it 
were, it would still be possible to construct a principle which is itself not sensitive to 
historical circumstances. Consider multiple choice situations, each with parties who are 
perfectly aware of and responsive to moral reasons but who represent the persons belonging 
to societies with different historical circumstances and stages of development. If the 
principles and rules in each choice situation are identical, then historical information does not 
affect the content of the rules. However, suppose that the account of right making features 
changed depending on the level of development and the particular historical circumstances. 
There would still be some definite description of what the right making features are in each 
circumstance. Moreover, since everyone is aware of all moral reasons, everyone is not only 
aware of the what the right making features are in their own historical context and level of 
development, they are aware of all counterfactual cases as well. If they are aware of what the 
right making features would be in the counterfactual cases, then they can construct a 
conditional that covers those possibilities. Thus anyone who is appropriately responsive to 
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moral reasons will accept that principle regardless of the historical circumstances and level of 
development of the society he lives in. Thus, if parties aim at picking out the principles that 
would themselves regulate the way social rules may change with historical circumstances, the 
choice situation can eliminate historical information without affecting the outcome of the 
choice situation.  
I have established, as a logical claim about the structure of moral reasoning,  that even if the 
content of the just changes with the particular demographic, historical and developmental 
circumstances of a society, the principles which dictate how they must change in order to 
remain just are themselves invariant with respect to these particulars. In addition, I want to 
draw attention to the fact that such invariant principles have practical relevance as well. Any 
conception of a morally adequate society has at least an implicit, if not explicit constitution. 
Instead of being just at just one moment in time, once we try to conceive of a society 
remaining just over extended periods of time through various historical, developmental and 
demographic changes, we imagine that there must be some second order principle which 
dictates or constrains if and how primary or first order social rules change in response, if they 
do so at all, so that those primary rules remain just throughout. These second order rules or 
principles form the implicit constitution of any society. Because these principles are to guide 
changes in primary rules in spite of changes in various particular features of society, these 
constitutional principles must themselves be invariant with respect to such particulars. The 
principles chosen under a thick Veil of Ignorance are thus well suited to regulate the 
constitution of a just society.  
General Social Facts and Theories 
Often, what the Veil of Ignorance fails to conceal can require just as much justification as 
what it does conceal. In order to make sensible rules, knowledge about what kinds of claims 
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are being made and the general context in which they are made may become necessary. In 
addition, an understanding of the causal consequences of certain rules and systems may 
become similarly necessary as well. Admittedly, since at least in the initial stages, particular 
features of the society as well as its historical context are blocked by the Veil of Ignorance, it 
may be difficult, if not impossible to obtain a full and detailed appraisal of the effects of 
particular rules. Nevertheless, a set of validity rules and principles may still be obtained. 
While these basic rules and principles are more fundamental than the rules that will be 
directly coordinating action, there is no guarantee that these are the most fundamental of 
moral principles. Because of this, questions about whether our most fundamental moral 
principles are fact sensitive or fact insensitive are beside the point.7 Such questions can be 
bypassed by acknowledging that the principles chosen in the OP may not be the most 
fundamental and can therefore legitimately be sensitive to at least some kinds of general 
facts. For example, what kind of claim does one make when one makes a claim in the name 
of religious practice? Is it merely another kind of preference? Or is it a commitment to 
reaching heaven when said claimant dies? Answering such a question requires us to 
understand basic sociological facts. This is consistent with the idea that these principles are 
not sensitive to other facts. This is also consistent with the idea that these principles are what 
everyone will find acceptable as they can be supported by reasons found in someone’s own 
comprehensive doctrine. Finally, it is consistent with the notion that these principles are 
explications of just rules. The principles characterise what these rules have in common.  
As I have argued earlier and pace Rawls, the only general facts and theories that the parties 
should be aware of are those that are publicly available. By this, I mean, that no alleged 
general facts and social theories which are uniquely subscribed to by any narrow subset of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines are known by the parties. To count as reasonable for the 
                                                     
7
 See G. A. Cohen’s Facts and Principles (Cohen 2005) for the argument for fact-insensitivity and Ronzoni’s 
and Valentini’s On the meta-ethical status of constructivism (Ronzoni 2008) for a reply. 
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application of the above constraint, the social theoretic component of the comprehensive 
doctrine must not exhibit any significant defects in theoretical reasoning. The best we can do 
at this point is to presuppose that whatever body of knowledge that forms the consensus in 
the social sciences fits these criteria. At least in principle, academic research is open to 
enquiry and criticism regardless of the critic’s background. The anonymous peer review 
process is supposed to allow the reasoned evaluation of ideas without appeal to author or 
reviewer’s backgrounds. This in turn is supposed to weed out particularly bad instances of 
theoretical reasoning. In principle, a consensus reached in such circumstances is likely to be 
the best account of the social world we have. That is not to say that such presuppositions 
cannot be defeated, but I will set aside such questions for now8.  
As I have argued in the third chapter, this aspect of the Veil of Ignorance is justified by the 
publicity requirement and in turn the requirement that the conception of justice be stable for 
the right reasons in a society characterised by reasonable pluralism. As I argued, any account 
of stability is going to require that the conception of justice not rely on factive claims like 
those regarding the existence and nature of a deity which are not publicly available. That is to 
say, the sorts of considerations which are morally relevant from the standpoint of a 
conception of justice which is to be stable for the right reasons in a pluralistic society cannot 
include fact claims which are specific to some particular conception of the good. This means 
that the first sort of choice situation in which fully informed parties perfectly responsive to 
moral considerations choose principles of justice cannot involve such claims if the principles 
that are chosen from it are to be acceptable to all. That is, such parties would not be 
responsive to factive claims that are peculiar to one or a few conceptions of the good. 
Consequently, information about whether any such claims are true can be eliminated without 
                                                     
8
 Given that the information needed at this stage regarding an elaboration of the circumstances of justice, it 
would be genuinely surprising if current social science got it wrong. 
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affecting the outcome of the choice situation. Thus, the Veil of Ignorance will prevent parties 
from knowing if such factive claims are true.  
It is important to note that while the other parts of the Veil of Ignorance model reasoning that 
can be found in any conception of justice (and is at best only trivially selective), this last 
aspect models reasons found in conceptions that are stable in a pluralistic society.  
The nature of the parties behind the Veil 
Given that there is a Veil of Ignorance which hides personal particulars as well as particular 
facts about the society that those the parties represent will live in when the Veil is lifted, it 
seems an open question as to whether rational mutual disinterest is indeed the stance that is 
required of the parties behind the Veil. Is rational mutual disinterest really an accurate 
simplification of being properly attuned to the relevant reasons? The choice situation 
consisting of fully informed and perfectly motivated ideal agents is itself formed by partially 
informed ideal agents sharing information about what their reasons are. Whatever reasons 
fully informed agents have is derived from the prima facie reasons that their partially 
informed past selves had. That is to say, the key problem in bridging the gap between prima 
facie reasons and principles of justice is the integration problem. Once the various prima 
facie reasons have been integrated together in one coherent scheme, the principles follow 
trivially from that scheme. Of course, the integration problem is non-trivial. Supposing that 
pleasure is the only good, that someone’s pleasure is increased by a system of rules is a prima 
facie reason in favour of that system, at least according to a hedonist. However, some 
people’s pleasure can come at the expense of others’. Given hedonism, there seem to be 
many possible solutions to the problem of how to trade-off different people’s pleasure. One 
could be a maximising utilitarian, an average utilitarian, a prioritarian, a sufficientarian or 
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perhaps someone who treats not-causing-others-pain as an absolute side constraint to be 
abided by.   
Given the above specification of the integration problem, it makes sense to posit a two stage 
process by which parties move from being only aware of and thus responsive to the reasons 
associated with those they represent to being aware of and responsive to all moral reasons. 
The first stage involves being aware of and responsive to each prima facie reason in a manner 
consistent with their status as prima facie reasons. That is, all else equal, the party would 
respond to the moral reasons that ground any claims that person could make as if he were 
representing that person. And this would in turn be the case for all persons whether or not that 
person was actually represented by the party. This is obvious once we recall that the 
preference each party has for successful pursuit of her HOI is the appropriate response to the 
prima facie reasons associated with her. The second stage involves integrating all those prima 
facie reasons into a coherent whole. This integration must not be mediated by external 
influences as then the resulting principle would not be purely a product of moral reasons, but 
could possibly contain deviations from the most morally justified principle. Since this 
integration is not mediated by any external intervening influences and is motivated by 
features internal to those prima facie reasons, an overall appropriate response to those prima 
facie reasons pre-integration is identical to an appropriate response to those reasons post-
integration. If the responses were different, then there would be some intervening influence 
over and above the reasons themselves. 
As I have argued earlier, it is appropriate to characterise the party representing a person PA 
who is fully responsive to the HOI, BA, of the person she represents as preferring more 
success vis a vis HOI to less. If this is the case, then the proper response of a party 
representing someone else PB responding appropriately to those prima facie reasons is for 
that party to prefer success with respect to HOI BA as if she were representing PA. That is to 
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say if some preference ordering of conceptions is an appropriate response to some set of 
moral reasons represented by HOI BA, then that same preference ordering of conceptions 
must be held by anyone when they focus solely on BA. Thus, the appropriate response by a 
party to all the moral reasons, that is, to everyone’s HOI is to prefer the success of each 
person’s HOI as if she was that person. There may be a question as to how all those 
preferences are to be integrated coherently, but prior to any such integration, no mistake is 
made in preferring each person’s successful pursuit of her HOI as if she were representing 
that person. That is to say, pre integration, the appropriate response to all the prima facie 
moral reasons is to have the preference orderings of conceptions of justice that fit each 
person’s HOI when that person’s HOI is considered on its own. It may very well be that the 
preference orderings would shift when the party considers each person’s HOI on its own, but 
that is only because the party has not integrated all the reasons into a coherent whole yet. 
When we introduce the Veil of Ignorance, the situation can be simplified further. The party 
prefers most the conception which enables the achievement, to the largest extent, the person’s 
HOI when he attends to each person’s HOI only. When he attends to one person’s HOI he 
screens out his concern for others’ HOI because he is only attending to that set of reasons. 
Since he does this for each and every person simultaneously, when the Veil is introduced, he 
continues to do this. That is to say, when he is considering a particular person, he prefers the 
conception which would enable to the greatest extent said person’s successful pursuit of his 
HOI as if he represents them and was only concerned about them. Introducing the Veil of 
Ignorance removes information about who he represents and his attitude is thus equivalent to 
wanting to maximise the achievement of HOI that the person one represents will experience 
under a conception of justice regardless of who that person turns out to be. This just is 
rational mutual disinterestedness. Given that the proper response to all the moral reasons is 
reducible to mutual disinterestedness once the Veil of Ignorance is introduced, any deviation 
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from rational mutual disinterestedness would be an inappropriate response to all the moral 
reasons. 
I have thus, in this chapter, shown that there is a choice situation in which the parties would 
choose the correct principles of justice and that this choice situation has a thick Veil of 
Ignorance which prevents parties from knowing who they represent and the particular 
features of the society they will end up in. I have also shown the parties in such a choice 
situation are mutually disinterested. Combined with the account of people’s HOI that I 
corrected in the previous chapter and an account of which general social facts and theories 
are to be relied on, the choice situation resembles the OP in all but one respect. The account 
of the highest order interests does not necessarily include the development of the capacity to 
revise one’s final ends. That is to say, a person’s highest order interests are described as the 
pursuit of his conception of the good, and the development of his two moral powers, a 
capacity for the pursuit of a person’s conception of the good and a capacity for a sense of 
justice. While the parties know that they will have a definite conception of the good, they do 
not know which conception they will have and they do not, behind the Veil, regard any 




There are two ways to understand the thesis I have just spelled out. Reading from front to 
back, one can understand me as making a general criticism about Rawls’s employment of 
WRE, a development of that criticism in showing how the premises employed by Rawls fall 
short and finally a demonstration of why WRE is unnecessary. Reading from back to front, I 
produce a novel derivation of the OP, then an explanation as how my derivation is superior 
and a further account of why WRE, the method with which Rawls previously justified the OP 
was problematic. These two readings mutually support each other.  
Given that the choice situation I have derived differs slightly from the OP, it may merely be a 
terminological point as to whether I have actually derived the OP or something else. I will 
assume that I have done the former and only shored up support for what could be supported. 
To call it something other than the OP would be to arrogate too much credit to myself. The 
idea that people behind a thick Veil of Ignorance being tasked to choose principles of justice 
is still originally Rawls’s. Any modifications I have made can be said to consist of fine 
tunings. Given that non-trivial principles can indeed be derived from the OP, one could 
wonder how this was possible given that it was allegedly derived from merely formal 
considerations. The requirement that the principles stably order a pluralistic society is 
substantively selective. The requirements such a condition generates may not be products of 
logical necessity, but they are the requirements of nomological necessity. This reveals one 
shortfall of this thesis. Actual empirical research is required to determine firstly if any 
conception could be stable for the right reasons and secondly what would actually undermine 
stability for the right reasons. I have thus far, assumed that severe value conflicts between a 
person and the conception governing his society can undermine stability. I also entertain the 
possibility that the promulgation of rules using unshared reasons can provide a disincentive 
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against accepting that rule. Empirical research is needed to see what if anything would 
undermine stability and whether reducing these destabilising features is sufficient to secure 
stability. 
Finally, given that I have provided a way to make the argument for the principles from the 
OP fully deductive, a third appropriate avenue of further research is finding out which 
principles, if any, would be chosen. A further task is figuring out how to systematically relax 
the constraints on information in subsequent iterations of the choice situation. In addition, 
working out the particular set of social rules that is most appropriate for a particular 
pluralistic society like Singapore or the United States would show the practical relevance of 
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